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EFFICIENT CONTRACTING BETWEEN FOREIGN INVESTORS
AND HOST STATES: EVIDENCE FROM STABILIZATION CLAUSES
Bilateral investment treaties are agreements between sovereign states that give broad protections to investors
and investments made within the jurisdiction of the other state. The prevailing view in the academy and
practice is that developing countries sign bilateral investment treaties in order to reassure investors from
developed states that their investments will be safe from changes in domestic law. Without these “credible
commitments,” investors would be deterred from making investments, depriving developing countries of foreign
capital. This Article disputes that view by demonstrating that foreign investors and host states effectively
contract around the risk of changes in the law. This Article applies transaction cost economic theory to the
most comprehensive empirical study of stabilization clauses (provisions intended to manage post-investment
changes in domestic law) recently conducted under the auspices of the World Bank's International Finance
Corporation. The analysis shows that investors and states demonstrate principles of efficient contracting even
without the protections of bilateral investment treaties (BITs). This finding adds to current research focusing
on the “credible commitment” story. The Article concludes that (1) BITs can be explained as instruments
developed and developing states use in their competition for markets and capital and (2) differences in the
reasons states execute BITs raise significant doubts about conclusions drawn based on aggregate phenomena.
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*263 I. INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) in the late 1980s and early 1990s generated robust debate on
whether these treaties actually advance their presumed goal of increasing and protecting foreign direct investment in
developing countries or whether they represent an economically unjustified benefit to business entities incorporated in
capital exporting countries. BITs are treaties signed between two sovereign states that give private investors certain
protections for investments made in the other state. The substantial majority of BITs are signed between one developed
state and one developing state. The parties generally agree to refer disputes over their promises to international
arbitration for resolution. Advocates and scholars criticize both the economic rationale behind BITs and their effects
on developing countries. First, they question whether BITs increase investment in developing states; second, they argue
BITs undermine the legitimate regulatory authority of the state; finally, they allege BITs feed an international arbitration
industry that, at best, lacks transparency and, at worst, issues inconsistent decisions shaped by conflicting motives. 1
Recent scholarship has attempted to identify a pro-investment “mythology” of BITs, attacking that mythology as lacking
empirical and logical coherence. 2
This Article offers an efficiency rationale for the rejection of BITs in *264 favor of direct negotiation between foreign
investors and host states. In many cases, BITs are unnecessary; under some circumstances, they may undermine efficient
contracting. My argument relies in significant part on the framework developed by Ronald Coase and Oliver Williamson
on the “theory of the firm,” 3 which argues that boundedly rational, opportunistic parties will adopt one of several
alternative institutions that maximize transaction gains while minimizing transaction costs. 4 This Article applies these
insights to a recent comprehensive study of contracting behavior between states and foreign investors. The study shows
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these parties ensure commitments to each other with a variety of contractual mechanisms that efficiently distribute the
risks of changes in local law.
The principal purpose of this Article is to demonstrate that investors and host states, by and large, effectively construct
conflict-resolving institutions without the “credible commitments” 5 BITs purportedly *265 provide. 6 The article
relies on a recent empirical study of “stabilization clauses” in agreements between foreign investors and host states.
Stabilization clauses are provisions in individual investment contracts that govern how, if at all, laws enacted postinvestment will apply to the investor or investment. This study, coordinated between the World Bank's International
Finance Corporation (IFC) and the U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Business and Human
Rights (UN Special Representative), obtained seventy-six current investment contracts and twelve model investment
contracts. The data gleaned from these contracts support predictions generated under the Coase-Williamson framework:
parties will adopt stronger institutional protections as the object of the contract increases in mutual importance.
A secondary argument is that, in some circumstances, BITs may undermine efficient contracting between foreign
investors and host states. 7 Because the terms of BITs are broader and generally lopsided in favor of the investor, an
investor may choose to rely on the provisions of the BIT instead of a stabilization clause. Even where a stabilization clause
is negotiated between the parties, a foreign investor may (1) ex post, incorporate a holding company in a jurisdiction that
will give it greater protections under a BIT than the stabilization clause, 8 or (2) if a dispute arises, use the most-favorednation clauses in BITs to argue the most favorable BIT to which the host state is a party represents the applicable *266
law. 9 BITs may, in fact, reduce or eliminate alternative institutional possibilities investors and host states might use in
the event a host state changes its law in a manner affecting the value of the investment. 10
This thesis adds an important dimension to the prevailing theory which asserts that capital importing or developing
countries sign BITs as part of an effort to encourage or reassure investors. 11 While this explanation might account
for some decisions to sign BITs, there is evidence to show that developed or capital exporting countries also compete-not only for access to new or emerging markets, but also to attract (or retain) domiciliary investors. 12 Foreign policy
objectives also complicate the competition for global capital. It is often unclear whether the desire to promote and protect
foreign investment drives political and diplomatic calculations or vice versa. 13
*267 To the extent that principles of efficient contracting, as articulated by Coase and Williamson, might improve
both the BIT negotiating process and the overall regime of BITs, it is worth providing a sustained treatment of the
topic to do so. 14 Even if the proliferation of BITs displaces foreign investor-host state contracting, it may be possible
to apply lessons learned from investor-state negotiations to BIT negotiations which are often one-sided and tend to
allocate greater risk to the host state and its citizens. 15 While some scholars have explored the extent to which BITs
duplicate protections provided in investment contracts, the literature is lacking (1) evidence to support the basic claim
that contracting may provide a complete alternative to BITs and (2) a sustained analysis of whether foreign investment
decisions closely approximate the same contracting principles that enjoy empirical support in the domestic context.
This paper is organized as follows: Part II of this Article provides a brief history of bilateral investment treaties. Part
III explains the Coase-Williamson framework for analyzing efficient contracting and predicting the development of
conflict-reducing institutions. Part IV comprehensively analyzes the study of investment agreement stabilization clauses
conducted by Andrea Shemberg under the auspices of the IFC and the UN Special Representative. The analysis will
support the views that (1) prior to the proliferation of BITs, investors contracted with host governments around political
risks using a variety of conflict-reducing institutions, (2) the complexity of these institutions by and large reflected the
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probability that one or both parties would act opportunistically (low probability corresponding to relatively simple
dispute resolution mechanisms), and (3) the proliferation of BITs may undermine investment-specific arrangements. In
Part V, I argue the view of BITs as “credible commitments” from developing countries toward investors in developed
countries is too narrow. BITs are one of many instruments available to states to accomplish interrelated economic and
political objectives. The literature, therefore, is skewed in at least two directions: first, it over-emphasizes competition
between developing, as opposed to developed, countries; second, it tends to assume uniformity in the objectives behind
BITs.
II. HISTORY AND PROLIFERATION OF BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES
A. Political Risk
A foreign investor will endeavor to minimize at least the following *268 risks after making the decision to invest:
commercial risk (prices for a commodity or good may drift above or below estimates), financial risk (interest rates may
rise or fall beyond an anticipated range), natural disasters, and political risk--the risk a change in law will diminish
the value of the investment. 16 Political risk in this context describes the incentives host governments have to pass
laws or regulations that extract greater value from a project or investment after the investor has sunk significant costs
building facilities, obtaining labor, and establishing requisite conditions. 17 Historically, foreign investors worried about
nationalization per se; now, their concerns are focused on less sweeping but nevertheless costlyenvironmental, health,
labor, and tax changes. To reduce this risk, investors might rely on the ability to petition their home governments to act
on their behalf; to conclude agreements that give them expanded rights vis-à-vis host states; and to negotiate contractual
provisions directly with host governments. An investor may also reduce political risk by procuring insurance or engaging
in a joint venture, enabling it simultaneously to limit its exposure and increase the number of parties that can pressure
a government that passes an unfavorable law or regulation.
B. Diplomatic Protection for Foreign Investors
In the event a host government violates customary international law, causing a breach of contract, or direct or indirect
expropriation, an investor may have access to the diplomatic protections of its home government. 18 A state is liable
under customary international law where (1) it breaches a contract with an alien investor and (2) that breach was caused
by discriminatory or arbitrary conduct. 19 Furthermore, a state may take action against another state for direct or
indirect expropriation where the host state “impairs the value of an investment through unilateral interference with a
*269 contract by legislative or administrative means” and fails to “properly compensate” the investor. 20 In either
event, the home state acts when the customary and legitimate expectations its citizens enjoy when visiting a foreign but
friendly territory have been violated, and it asserts those rights as a sovereign. 21 Practically, however, the process of this
ex post effort at compensation is slow and deeply influenced by surrounding political considerations.
Before the modern regime of international investment arbitration, investors often were required to exhaust the domestic
courts of the host country before receiving diplomatic assistance. 22 Although empirical studies are inconclusive on the
issue, investors perceived these courts as inhospitable, and they sought other forums to resolve investor-state disputes. 23
As recently as 1998, states tried to address this problem with broad, multilateral investment agreements. 24 These
attempts failed for several reasons, including intractable differences between developed and developing countries and,
with the proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), the extraordinary mobilization of civil society groups
arguing the MAI would disproportionately disadvantage developing countries. 25
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*270 C. Contractual Protection for Investors
Because of the unreliability of diplomatic protections, investors often used agreements with host governments to
manage political risk. 26 In long-term contracts, investors included clauses that sought to render new laws affecting the
investment's value inapplicable to the investment. Generally referred to as stabilization clauses, parties drafted these
provisions to explicitly cover political risk. For example, a stabilization clause might provide that:
the GOVERNMENT hereby undertakes and affirms that at no time shall the rights (and the full and
peaceful enjoyment thereof) granted by it under this Agreement be derogated from or otherwise prejudiced
by any Law or by the action or inaction of the GOVERNMENT, or any official thereof, or any other
Person whose actions or inactions are subject to the control of the GOVERNMENT. In particular,
any modifications that could be made in the future to the law as [i]n effect on the Effective Date shall
not apply to the CONCESSIONAIRE and its Associates without their prior written consent, but the
CONCESSIONAIRE and its Associates may at any time elect to be governed by the legal and regulatory
provisions resulting from changes made at any time in the Law as in effect on the Effective Date. 27

While some legal scholars predicted the demise of these provisions during the wave of nationalizations in the 1950s and
1960s, foreign investors and states continued to use them. 28
Stabilization clauses manage political risk through a wide range of strategies. They may freeze both fiscal and non-fiscal
law with respect to an investment, specify a given set of issue areas that are frozen, require compensation in the event
of any change in the law, require limited compensation or compensation over a given threshold after a change in the
law, carve out exemptions from certain laws, or protect against financial loss on account of a limited set of changes in
the law. 29 The complexity, *271 diversity, and history of stabilization clauses play an important evidentiary role in
the argument presented here.
D. BITs: The Convergence of Diplomatic and Contractual Protections
Bilateral investment treaties combine aspects of diplomatic and contractual protections for investors. 30 Generally, BITs
are negotiated between capital-exporting nations (developed or home states) and capital-importing nations (developing
or host states), although BITs are increasingly executed between two developing countries. 31 BITs contain provisions
guaranteeing investors from the home state protections for their “investments” in the host state. These guarantees may
include fair and equitable or non-discriminatory treatment, 32 free transfer of profits and currency, and, in many cases,
payment of compensation should a host state adopt measures having the effect of direct or indirect expropriation. 33
BITs do not, typically, include enumerated rights for host states outside their ability to prohibit certain economic
activities altogether or to take normal regulatory action in the interest of public order, public health or public morality-so-called “non-precluded measures.” 34 Host states are still potentially obligated to compensate investors for these
“regulatory takings.” 35 Most of these treaties provide investors access to one of the major international arbitral tribunals
to vindicate rights under a BIT. BITs often provide for arbitration at the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) because it is perceived to move quickly 36 and to issue decisions less prone to appeal or
unenforceability than those issued by domestic courts or other arbitration forums. 37 Although the position *272 staked
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out by Argentina as a result of its economic crisis of 2002 is changing these perceptions, states generally pay awards
issued by ICSID tribunals voluntarily. 38
The origin and number of BITs in existence is well-documented, although the reasons for their proliferation remain in
dispute. 39 After the first BIT--generally agreed to be the treaty concluded between Germany and Pakistan in 1959--the
number of BITs increased steadily. 40 At the end of the 1980s, records at the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) showed 385 BITs; a decade later, the number reached 1,857; 41 current estimates show approximately 3,000
BITs in force. 42
The most parroted theory about BITs is that developing countries sign them as a way to “credibly commit” to investors
so as to encourage foreign direct investment. 43 Under one elaboration of this theory, scholars explain the rise of BITs
as a response to the decolonization and nationalization movements of the 1950s and 1960s:
The nationalization of British oil assets by Iran in 1951, the expropriation of Liamco's concessions in Libya
in 1955, and the nationalization of the Suez Canal by Egypt a year later served notice of a new militancy on
the part of investment hosts. The nationalization of sugar interests by Cuba in the 1960s further undercut
assumptions about the security of international *273 investments. 44

Simultaneously, developing countries used the U.N. General Assembly to pass resolutions that purportedly upended
customary international norms for determining compensation in the event of nationalization. Those norms had been
advanced by capital exporting states to argue that customary international law required the payment of “prompt,
adequate, and effective” compensation for the taking of property whether through direct or indirect expropriation. 45
Certain scholars of international law and international political economy have challenged important aspects of this
theory. Jose Alvarez, for example, argues the collective activity of developing countries at the U.N. had a relatively
small effect on what were understood to be the customary international norms at the time, 46 so there was no need to
“reassure” investors through BITs. 47 He offers several alternative explanations: after the decline of the Soviet Union in
the late 1980s, developing countries signed BITs (1) in order to signal--both internally and externally--their acceptance
that command economy norms were dead or dying; (2) to signal that they would work toward fulfilling the expectations
of international lenders; (3) as part of a broader effort to build market-based domestic institutions; and (4) to satisfy the
pressures exerted by certain domestic constituencies. 48 Joseph Stiglitz views the proliferation of BITs as a response to
NGOs' extraordinarily strong resistance to the OECD's proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment which would
have created *274 a multilateral instrument--like the laws under which the WTO operates--giving the protections now
obtained through BITs. 49 Almost all scholars, however, at least impliedly accept that the driving force behind BITs is
developing countries competition for investments from companies based in developed countries.
The economic effect of these treaties is also disputed. 50 Some studies conclude developing countries that sign BITs
experience increases in foreign direct investment and growth while others see no impact or even a negative effect,
considering the regulatory restraints placed upon the host state. 51 Moreover, as awards from ICSID increase in size,
the overall effect on host state development and global investment flows is largely unknown. 52
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E. Insurance Regimes
Foreign investors may also protect their investments through an increasing number of national, private or international
insurance regimes, as long as they meet certain conditions. 53 U.S. investors, for example, can obtain insurance through
the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), as long as the investment is predominately owned by Americans, is
made in certain countries, and is intended to promote the economic *275 development of the host country, among other
requirements. 54 OPIC also requires investors to invest in host countries that have subrogation treaties with the United
States, allowing OPIC to attempt to reclaim its expenditure from the host country, usually through a fiduciary agent
located in the host country (thereby avoiding direct political controversy). 55 Other common conditions imposed by
home countries offering insurance to their investors include the requirement that the investment be in a host country with
which the home country already has a BIT, 56 or that the investment be new or an expansion of an existing investment. 57
Private investment insurance programs have advantages and disadvantages compared to national programs. While they
cover nationals of any country and can operate independently of policy objectives, 58 they also must run a profit and are
limited in the types of coverage they can provide (such as long-term investment guarantees). 59 The private insurance
market is growing and now accounts for approximately half the market previously dominated by national insurance
schemes and the World Bank's Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). 60
Since its creation, MIGA has been joined by 175 countries 61 and has issued over $21 billion of guarantees for over 600
projects. 62 MIGA will insure any investment made by a national or company of a member state within another member
state. 63 MIGA insurance covers the risks associated with currency transfer, expropriation, breach of contract, and war
and civil disturbance. Disputes are submitted to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague. 64 To date, MIGA
has only paid out three claims: two claims in response to host government intervention to control economic crises 65
*276 and one claim for a project damaged by a Maoist rebel attack in Nepal. 66 However, MIGA has also resolved
over fifty disputes over its guaranteed investments to prevent claims filings. 67
F. Joint Ventures
Investors may also reduce political risk by engaging in joint ventures. Doing so can simultaneously limit an investor's
exposure and increase the number of parties that might eventually pressure a government that passes an unfavorable law
or regulation. 68 In a joint venture with a state-owned enterprise, the state might theoretically be deterred from passing
laws or regulations that would diminish the value of the state enterprise. The stability of such arrangements, however,
depends on the business relationship between state and investor. 69 Failure to agree on the terms of an investment
during a renegotiation, for example, might lead to expropriation of the private portion of the joint venture. 70 However,
assuming profits are high for the host state or the host state derives a benefit from the private investor's expertise, foreign
investors may use joint ventures as part of an effective political risk management strategy. 71
G. The Relative Importance of BITs in Securing Investments
Despite the alternatives available and used for investment protection, scholars, practitioners, and international
arbitrators focus on BITs as the key security against host states' cheating on the original investment bargain. Recently,
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however, Jason Webb Yackee has argued that the original theoretical premise--that without BITs, cheating would be
inevitable--is specious. First, he notes, any host government seeking subsequent investment would not cheat on an
original investment out of reputational concern. 72 Second, it remains empirically unanswered whether BITs encourage
or deter investors from negotiating specific political or legal risks. Signing BITs may deter such negotiation because
“[m]odern investment treaties . . . include methods of property and contract protection which individual investors, in an
often more difficult negotiating context, *277 might not have been able to negotiate on their own.” 73 Yackee suggests
a BIT regime may be appropriate for small or medium-sized enterprise but, as applied to large investors, undermines the
legitimacy of the international arbitration system and inefficiently distributes investment risk.
This Article provides theoretical and empirical support that investors and host states are, and have been, capable
of negotiating institutional arrangements of varying complexity based on the asset specificity of the investment. 74
Using the framework developed by Ronald Coase and Oliver Williamson, the thesis presented here is that investments
which require a shorter time commitment and fewer resources--like manufacturing, for example, because the presence
of many competitors drives down costs--will demonstrate simpler contracts with easy exit as a primary remedy for
investors. Investments that require a significant commitment of time and resources--like those in the extractive sector-will demonstrate more complex arrangements addressing specific risks. These contracts will be more likely to include
contractual provisions governing a host states' ability to change the law in a way that raises the investors' costs,
accompanied by specific arrangements for monitoring the extracted resource and resolving any disputes.
III. COASE, WILLIAMSON AND INCOMPLETE CONTRACTING
A. Coase and The Nature of the Firm
In 1937, Ronald Coase suggested that firms presented a special problem for the field of economics as it was then
understood. 75 If it were true, as Adam Smith had theorized, that the economic system worked itself autonomously
with supply effortlessly drifting to meet demand, there would be no reason for firms to exist. 76 All economic activity
would occur through arms-length contracts. 77 Firms existed, Coase theorized, because *278 arms-length contracts
themselves involved some cost. 78
Rather than continually negotiating with parties on the market, an owner would bring the transaction under his or her
control and reduce the costs of making contracts. 79 Whether or not an owner would use the market, conclude longerterm contracts, or bring an activity under his or her control became known generally as the “make-or-buy” question.
In The Nature of the Firm, Coase implicitly established a spectrum of institutional arrangements between markets-the price mechanism--and hierarchy--the firm--where command and control displaces the spot market. 80 Scholars
following Coase sought to articulate the conditions under which parties used firms instead of markets and to explore
the institutional arrangements that might economize on transaction costs as initially explored by Coase. 81 In between
markets and firms, they identified numerous contractual mechanisms that promoted efficient long-term arrangements.
B. Oliver Williamson: Bounded Rationality, Opportunism and Asset Specificity
Scholars 82 did not elaborate extensively on Coase's 1937 essay until *279 after the publication of the arguably more
influential The Problem of Social Cost. 83 Drawing on the intellectual contributions of John R. Commons, Herbert
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Spencer, 84 and Karl Llewelyn, 85 Oliver Williamson approached the problem outlined by Coase by analyzing (1) the
characteristics of contracting parties and (2) the relative importance of the object of the contract. 86 With respect to
contracting parties, Williamson assumed two characteristics: (1) bounded rationality and (2) opportunism. 87 With
respect to the object of the negotiation, Williamson argued institutional arrangements move toward hierarchy as the
good or service negotiated for increases in mutual importance. 88
1. Bounded Rationality
Bounded rationality is a function of the contract formation process. Future events, contingencies, and needs suffer from
what might otherwise be termed a lack of imagination. 89 It refers to the limitations and costs humans face in acquiring
and processing the full range of information *280 required for optimal decision-making. Contracting parties face an
inability to negotiate future plans because parties “have to find a common language to describe states of the world and
actions with respect to which prior experience may not provide much of a guide.” 90 This condition of human frailty
means contracts will always be “incomplete,” and will require, when entering an exchange relationship, a contracting
party to assume the other party's behavior will be opportunistic in the future. 91 Some scholars have extensively
elaborated on humans' cognitive limitations, while others have used the phrase to simply denote the impossibility of
predicting the future. 92
2. Opportunism
Opportunism is the tendency of economic agents to disclose information “in a selective and distorted manner . . .
[including] effects to mislead, disguise, obfuscate, and confuse . . . .” 93 The essence of opportunism is an individual's
aspiration to realize his or her own egoistic *281 interests, accompanied by cunning and deceit. 94 Opportunism is
closely related with asset specificity or “hold up” in the theory-of-the-firm literature. 95 Because humans are limited in
their cognitive capacities, and because others will provide distorted information, parties demand institutions to protect
themselves. 96 Opportunism can be both ex ante (parties must assume information provided to them is distorted or
imprecise to the advantage of the other party) and ex post (upon an unforeseen change in circumstances, a party will
attempt to manipulate that change in its favor). 97
3. Asset Specificity
Asset specificity refers to the idea that an investment made for purposes of a particular transaction has more value for
that transaction than any alternative purpose. 98 Because bounded rationality and opportunistic behavior may cause
the expropriation of gains, parties demand institutional arrangements of varying strength to govern their contracts. 99
These institutions gain strength as the level of uncertainty and the value of the asset within the relationship increase. 100
Where parties meet on the open market and conclude simple arms-length exchanges, the traditional economic forces of
supply and demand operate without significant cost. 101 *282 When parties contract for assets uniquely valuable to
the parties' use and not readily available for alternative use or users, greater opportunities for exploitation emerge. 102
Examples of transactions involving highly specific assets include:
location of an electricity generating plant next door to a coal mine that is going to supply it, a firm's
expansion of capacity to satisfy the demands of a particular customer, the training a worker undertakes
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to operate a particular set of machines or to work with a particular group of individuals, or a worker's
relocation to a town where he has a new job. 103

These factors influence transactions differently, giving rise to manifold arrangements (contracting regimes) that
economize on incentives to exploit. 104 Contract-cost economizing regimes vary depending on the perceived need of the
exchanged good or service provided and the limiting effects of bounded rationality and opportunism. 105 Within the
literature on BITs, 106 asset specificity passes under the name of the “obsolescing bargain” or the problem of “holdup”:
*283 Holdup occurs when one contracting party [with an asset specific investment] threatens another with
economic harm unless concessions are granted by the threatened party. The potential for holdup exists only
within contractual relationships, not in initial contract negotiations, and it results from the investment of
relationship-specific assets by one of the parties. Anticipation of holdup is said to motivate the structure
of contractual relationships. 107

The 1926 merger between GM and Fisher Body classically illustrates the process by which parties move from contract
to hierarchy as asset specificity increases. 108 In 1919, GM and Fisher Body concluded a ten-year agreement in which
GM agreed to an exclusive dealing clause as an incentive for Fisher Body to invest in highly specialized manufacturing
equipment (stamping machines and dies). 109 To prevent opportunistic behavior by Fisher Body (by charging monopoly
prices for the bodies), the contract stipulated prices could not exceed those of similarly manufactured bodies by
companies other than Fisher Body; disputes were to be settled by compulsory arbitration. 110 Soon after 1919, demand
for GM automobiles increased significantly, producing general dissatisfaction on GM's part with the price it was
paying for Fisher bodies;GM pressed Fisher Body to move its manufacturing plants nearer to GM plants, reducing
transportation and inventory costs. 111 Fisher Body refused and in 1924, GM began purchasing Fisher Body stock
and concluded a merger agreement in 1926. 112 The GM-Fisher Body relationship moved from market exchange to
vertical integration where asset specificity was very high. 113 The ten-year agreement provided many of the features-e.g., arbitration and price ceilings--that scholars like Coase and Williamson suggested be part of hybrid institutions to
promote efficient exchange. 114 The GM-Fisher Body example is one of several narratives used to show the empirical
support the theory enjoys. 115
*284 C. The Coase-Williamson Framework and Foreign Investment
Williamson predicts asset specificity, transaction frequency, and uncertainty are the primary factors which guide an
activity toward vertical integration, or the choice to bring a transaction within the firm. Between arms-length transactions
and command-and-control hierarchy are hybrid institutions that deepen the contracting parties' relationship and
commitment: hostages, arbitration, take-or-pay procurement clauses, tied sales, reciprocity, regulation, and threat of
reputational loss, among others. 116 In the investment context, an investor may include within the contract a demand
that a host state provide some service before releasing a royalty payment (a form of hostage exchange); 117 an investor
and a host state may appoint a neutral monitor to ensure the investor's accounting practices are fair; or, the host state may
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grant an investor freedom from changes in the law, with an exception for changes in environmental laws or regulations
instituted in order to keep pace with technological changes and duties to minimize environmental damage. 118
*285 Investment decisions are driven by many factors. Under liberal economic theory, the fundamental drive is to
deploy capital where it will generate the highest returns. 119 Foreign direct investment may result in higher returns where,
for example, a manufacturer can economize on transportation costs and there is a local demand for its products. 120 The
decision to invest may also reflect a fear of losing ground to competitors. 121 Finally, an enterprise might alternatively
gain access to a foreign market by licensing local producers, but the importance of controlling the quality of a valuable
trademark, for example, may encourage direct ownership. 122 Many of these factors shape the agenda investors use
during negotiations with host states.
1. Foreign Investment, Bounded Rationality and Opportunism
Both host states and investors are subject to the limitations (bounded rationality and opportunism) all contracting parties
face. Complex contracts governing long-term relationships, like investment contracts, are necessarily incomplete. “They
contain gaps and do not cover every possible aspect of the parties' relation, because the future state of the world is not
fully predictable . . .” 123 Investors and states may, for example, poorly predict what the price of an extracted resource
might be in the near term.
In addition to the risks of bounded rationality, both parties may impose opportunistic risks as well. Foreign investors, for
example, may present host state negotiators with marginal cases to institute a tax regime. 124 They may also manipulate
accounting practices or structure internal transactions to avoid taxes or other costs imposed by the host government. 125
In *286 infrastructure, investors may sell themselves goods and services from affiliated companies at inflated prices
knowing “[g]overnment policing of conflict-of-interest issues of this sort [is] generally lax or absent in most developing
countries.” 126 Manufacturing plants importing components from a parent investor company may manipulate transfer
prices. Investors may underestimate the environmental costs manufacturing or extractive investments may impose.
Host states may pass laws or issue regulations after an investment agreement is in place which raises the cost of the
investment. 127 Successor governments may renege on promises made by previous governments. 128 Host states or their
affiliated state-owned enterprises may provide faulty advice as to the cost of a project. 129
2. Foreign Investment and Asset Specificity
In the domestic context, evidence for the Coase-Williamson theory is often limited to case studies due to the difficulty of
obtaining consistent data on the cost of contracting, the complexity of a transaction, and, especially, asset specificity. 130
Similarly, applying the Coase-Williamson theory to foreign investment contracting can be done only with at least three
important qualifications. 131 First, economic exchange across international boundaries is subject to distortion from
national, regional and international trade and tax regimes. Second, jurisdictional idiosyncrasies affect the study *287 of
individual and aggregate economic phenomena. 132 Third, foreign direct investment can involve complicated evaluations
of currency exchange risk, local or regional market potential, and other industry-specific considerations. Despite these
distortions and analytical difficulties, predictions based on the theory find support in the case studies used here.
The Coase-Williamson theory predicts increasingly complex hybrid institutions as assets become more specific to the
relationship. When an investor has many options and competition is robust, simple exchange contracts will prevail.
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Where an investment requires significant capital outlays, ten or more years of exploration, and physical specificity, the
theory predicts a more complex institution will govern the relationship:
Firms in industries characterized by large sunk costs, asset specificity and immobility of assets, for example,
necessarily make more long-term commitments to host countries than firms in other industries . . In contrast,
small service or retail establishments generally have lower sunk costs and higher mobility, making exit
strategies less problematic. 133

i. Apparel and Footwear
As expected, in industries where retailers can choose from manufacturers in many states, such as the sportswear and
apparel industries, simple-to-administer-contracts are common. 134 Consider the example of Nike. Although known
primarily as a footwear retailer, Nike is also a significant retailer of sportswear apparel. The two product lines reflect
the fundamentals of Nike's contracting relationships. Footwear factories are “usually large, capital-intensive facilities,”
whereas garment factories are usually smaller and easy to establish. 135 According to Richard Locke, et al., *288
“[t]hese industry differences have a significant impact on the kinds of relationships that Nike can develop with its various
suppliers.” 136 In footwear:
Nike has been able to develop long-term relationships with several large Korean and Taiwanese firms.
With some of these firms, Nike designers create and then relay via satellite new footwear designs and
styles for upcoming seasons to suppliers, who in turn, develop the prototypes. Once these prototypes are
approved, these lead suppliers fax the product specifications to their various plants throughout Southeast
Asia, where production can take place almost immediately. This level of trust and coordination facilitates
both production and (presumably) compliance activities for Nike. 137

In apparel, on the other hand:
[G]iven short production cycles and volatile fashion trends, the situation is completely different. Nike works
with numerous suppliers, most of whom are also producing apparel in the same factories for other (often
competitor) companies. Given that different apparel suppliers specialize in particular market segments,
shifts in consumer preferences or fashion trends could translate into very short-term contracts with and/
or limited orders from Nike. This alters both the level of influence which Nike has with these suppliers as
well as its ability to monitor on a regular basis the production processes and working conditions of these
factories. 138

The complexities of Nike's contracts vary accordingly. While a handful of Korean and Taiwanese firms enjoy sharing
intellectual property and securer footwear orders (including an exclusive production relationship and guaranteed
monthly minimum orders), 139 generally a regime of short term contracts prevails in apparel. 140
ii. Owning or Leasing Land
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For foreign investments requiring land, the decision to purchase freehold rights or obtain long-term leases similarly varies
with the asset *289 specificity of the investment. Foreign investors entering garment, retail, hospitality, agribusiness,
and service sectors typically prefer to lease land so they can quickly exit should the investment take a downward
turn. 141 Conversely, investors in capital-intensive and/or physical infrastructure projects like machinery, electronics and
pharmaceuticals will tend to purchase land in freehold. 142

TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE
143

The likelihood of owning land is also correlated to the size of the investment. For larger investments, land purchase is
more likely than obtaining long-term leases.

TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE
144

The lease or purchase of land to serve investment needs is often accompanied by negotiations with the host government.
For example, investors must contract with host states in the manufacturing sector in order to receive special treatment,
such as free trade zones, or certain tax *290 incentives. 145 As Yackee notes, “Intel's practice when deciding whether
to construct new semi-conductor manufacturing facilities, for example, is to enter into intensive haggling with potential
host states over a variety of fine-grained matters, and to insist that any resulting deal be committed to a written contract
before the investment will be sunk.” 146
iii. Institutional Variation
Investors and host states have traditionally devised numerous contractual arrangements to address problems of bounded
rationality, opportunism, and holdup. Dalia Marin and Monika Schnitzer have documented the use of barter in
international trade where host states are reluctant to give access to foreign ownership in their markets. 147 In the
extractive industry, investors have mitigated political risk through early termination rights, open-ended exploration and
development commitments, and balancing of clarity and vagueness with respect to obligations and duties. 148 Indeed
“hostage-taking” is a method commonly used by foreign investors to reduce political risk--requiring the state to provide
some service and/or having the contractual right to withhold some payment until that service is provided or a condition
is met. 149
IV. STABILIZATION CLAUSES
Stabilization clauses are one mechanism by which investors and host states have ensured the credibility of their
commitments. 150 Not all investment contracts include stabilization clauses, but they are common in contracts for a

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

13

Harbison, Ashley 10/16/2017
For Educational Use Only

EFFICIENT CONTRACTING BETWEEN FOREIGN..., 31 Nw. J. Int'l L. &...

wide range of industries in most regions of the world. 151 Stabilization clauses are often coupled with renegotiation
clauses in investment agreements to provide for changes in circumstances affecting the interests of the investor and the
host state. 152 Investors and states use stabilization clauses to form part of the ground rules upon which the investors
operate the project; guide informal dealings and formal negotiations between the parties to the agreement; and serve
as a formal *291 protection of rights if a dispute should arise. 153 The clause may also provide the investor a legal
basis to resist compliance with new laws even if host government authorities are unable or unwilling to monitor the
investor's compliance and no formal dispute arises. The international case law largely supports the propositions that
(1) stabilization clauses are lawful and legally binding under international law and (2) parties treat stabilization clauses
as binding. 154
In “likely the first empirical study on modern stabilization practice covering a wide range of industries and regions of
the world,” Andrea Shemberg, in cooperation with the IFC and the UN Special Representative, obtained seventy-six
current investment contracts and twelve model contracts from various sources including international law firms (the
“Shemberg Study”). 155 The data gleaned from these contracts support predictions generated by the Coase-Williamson
theory: for highly asset specific investments like mining and petroleum, parties are inclined to agree that changes in
the law will be inapplicable to the investment. For sectors in which investments demonstrate lower asset specificity like
telecommunications or light manufacturing, stabilization clauses either do not exist or they are weaker, allowing for
compensation to an investor for complying with new laws only after reaching a certain threshold or exempting areas of
new laws like human rights codes altogether.
There are both acknowledged and unacknowledged limitations noted in the Shemberg Study. Evidence of the use
and function of stabilization clauses remains limited. 156 Agreements between investors and host governments are
generally confidential--details about them discovered only through legal proceedings or confidential interviews. Given
the hundreds or thousands of investment agreements in existence, the sample may provide a skewed glimpse into the
broader world of contracting between investors and states. Participating law firms extracted only specific information
requested for the study and did not make the entire contracts available nor did they disclose the identity of the investment
project. The lawyers who provided redacted investment agreements and *292 were interviewed about stabilization
clauses may, consciously or unconsciously, shape their redactions and statements in a way favoring existing or potential
clients. 157 Indeed, independent interviews with practitioners indicated that international arbitration litigation practices
at large private international law firms are heavily involved in pre-investment advising. 158 Participants in the Shemberg
Study did concede that the links between bilateral and regional investment treaties and stabilization clauses are not
well understood. 159 Investments made through project finance from regional or international lenders, secured through
political risk insurance or through a joint venture with a state-owned enterprise may face varying pressures as to the
type and strength of stabilization clauses. 160 The contracts used in the study were in English or had English translations
readily available. 161
Nevertheless, an empirical study of stabilization clauses of this breadth and scope is unlikely without financial and
logistical support from major funders like the IFC; therefore, the Shemberg Study provides a unique opportunity to
study investor-state contracting behavior. What follows is an elaboration of the findings of the study, including the kinds
of stabilization clauses used, the sectors in which they are prevalent, and how they demonstrate or refute principles of
efficient contracting according to the theories developed by Coase and Williamson.
A. Freezing Clauses

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

14

Harbison, Ashley 10/16/2017
For Educational Use Only

EFFICIENT CONTRACTING BETWEEN FOREIGN..., 31 Nw. J. Int'l L. &...

“Freezing clauses” render new laws completely inapplicable to the investment over the entire life of the project. These
clauses often secure a specific fiscal regime for an investment. For example,
The . . . Laws and Decrees which may in the future impose higher tax rates or more progressive rates of
[tax] or would otherwise impose a greater . . . tax liability than anticipated under Section . . . *293 of the
Upstream Project Agreement shall not apply to the Company.” 162

“Limited freezing clauses” render only a narrow class of laws or regulations inapplicable to an investment. For example,
a partial freezing clause might give a specific exemption to an investment for any new labor laws. 163
B. Economic Equilibrium Clauses
“Economic equilibrium clauses” protect against the financial effects of changes in the law as opposed to freezing the law's
applicability. An investor must comply with a new law, but the host state must compensate the investor for compliance
or allow adjustments to the agreement providing for a lower level of, or delayed compliance with, the new law. 164
Economic equilibrium clauses may impose a materiality threshold below which compensation is not permitted or may
require the host state to restore the investor to its original state “to the extent reasonably possible.” 165 A “limited
economic equilibrium clause” will provide for compensation for complying with new laws, but will only do so after a
certain threshold is reached. A limited economic equilibrium clause may also provide an exemption from the otherwise
applicable standards for applying economic equilibrium:
Notwithstanding the generality of the foregoing or anything to the contrary, the Parties acknowledge that
the provisions of [the economic equilibrium clause] shall not apply if . . . the new law or decree has been
enacted by the Government [state] with the intent of protecting health, safety, the environment or security,
and is generally applicable to all ventures having the same general purpose as does the Project. 166

C. Hybrid Stabilization Clauses
“Hybrid clauses generally give the investor an opportunity to demand adjustments to the contract, including exemption
from the law, to compensate the investor.” 167 Hybrid clauses explicitly provide that *294 exemptions from a law are
one way of restoring an investor to the position it held before the new law was passed. 168 An example:
if any existing Laws of [the host country] or any other applicable or existing law of any other Government, is
changed or repealed, or if new laws are introduced, or if there occurs a rise in the tax rate or the introduction
of a new tax, which bears unfavourably on the financial status of the Joint Venture or the Parties, then
the Parties will apply all efforts that are necessary to completely or partially release the Joint Venture or
the Parties from the above-mentioned changes, or the Parties will undertake all other necessary steps to
alleviate the unfavourable impact of these changes. 169
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D. Stabilization Clauses and Asset Specificity
Based on the theory elaborated by Coase and Williamson, highly asset-specific investments such as petroleum
extractions--where high fixed costs “require large capital injections in the early stages of the project and where long time
frames are needed for the economic viability of the project”--are more likely to enjoy a full freezing of the law, so as
to reduce to the greatest extent possible the uncertainty posed by local law. 170 For smaller infrastructure projects such
as road construction, involving less uncertainty but where changes in local law can still affect the expected value of the
investment, either general or limited economic equilibrium clauses will prevail. Factors important to determining the
likelihood of opportunism by a host government include its overall reputation for stability, the existence of transparent
and legitimate administrative processes, and an independent judiciary.
The table below presents a simplified view of the study's findings:
Sector

Full Freezing

Partial Freezing

Hybrid

Full Economic Equilibrium

Partial Economic None

Total

Equilibrium
Extractives

5

4

5

2

2

0

18

Other Transport

0

1

0

3

2

1

7

Infrastructure

1

0

1

1

1

0

4

Power

0

1

0

15

15

1

32

Road

0

0

0

2

4

0

6

Rail

0

0

0

2

3

0

5

Water

0

0

0

1

1

0

2

Telecom

0

0

0

1

0

1

2

Total Contracts

6

6

6

27

28

3

76

*295 1. Regional Differences
Stabilization clauses were featured with greater frequency and force in investment contracts with developing
countries. 171 Countries in sub-Saharan Africa, which are likely to have low or no ratings from risk rating agencies, were
far more likely to have full freezing clauses in their contracts. 172 Moreover, those stabilization clauses are notable for
their breadth. 173 Full freezing clauses are less likely to be found in agreements in the Middle East and North Africa,
South Asia, Europe and Central Asia, East Asia, and Latin America. 174 The study found limited freezing clauses in the
Middle East and North Africa; Latin America and the Caribbean; Eastern Europe, Southern Europe and Central Asia;
South Asia; and Sub-Saharan Africa. 175 Stabilization clauses in investment agreements with developed countries are
likely to have only the narrowest limited economic equilibrium clauses. 176
Although generally regional differences correspond with country credit risk ratings, the ratings for OECD countries
and Sub-Saharan African countries appear to be influenced by other factors. The study found that the OECD countries
with limited stabilization clauses in their investment agreements also possess low risk ratings. For sub-Saharan Africa,
Moody's had only rated one country. As expected, the Shemberg Study found a high percentage of freezing clauses as well
as a high percentage of full economic equilibrium clauses in investment agreements with sub-Saharan African countries.
The perception of political risk appears to drive these extreme differences. 177
*296 2. Freezing Clauses
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Stabilization clauses were also more prominent in investment agreements governing highly capital-intensive industries
where large initial outlays made investors “hostage” to host governments. 178 Every investment agreement in the
extractive sector, for example, contained some form of stabilization clause. In the telecommunications sector stabilization
clauses were present in only one of two agreements. The difference corresponds with the greater political risk associated
with a natural resource project than with a private sector public service project. 179
Five of the six full freezing clauses in the study governed investment agreements in the mining sector, where asset
specificity is very high. 180 Full and limited freezing clauses appeared in nine of eighteen of the extractive contracts.
In contrast, in sectors with significantly less physical (or other) asset specificity, freezing clauses were far less frequent.
Only one of thirty-two power projects, one of seven transportation contracts, and one of four infrastructure projects
included freezing clauses. Freezing clauses did not appear in the railroad, road, water, telecom, or health care contracts
or models. 181
These sectors do not require the same level of commitment by an investor or a host state; therefore, the contractual
mechanism is more flexible.
3. Economic Equilibrium Clauses
The most common form of stabilization clause identified in the study is the full or partial economic equilibrium
clause. Instead of targeting the sovereign legislative power of the state, they govern the effects of legislative changes on
investments. 182
*297 As with freezing clauses, economic equilibrium clauses are more likely in contracts involving non-OECD states
than in contracts involving OECD states. In Western Europe, only one rail project and one road project included a full
economic equilibrium clause; the remaining twenty-five investment agreements and model contracts provide for limited
economic equilibrium. 183
In non-OECD states, economic equilibrium clauses of both kinds were more common. In the electricity and water
industries, public authorities often can set prices and bar investors from passing regulatory cost increases on to end-users.
Economic equilibrium clauses provide a mechanism by which investors can guard against the risk of these legislativelyimposed higher costs. 184 In the Shemberg Study, approximately half of the water, telecommunications, and power
industry contracts contain full economic equilibrium clauses. Similarly, of five transportation contracts, three contained
full economic equilibrium clauses. 185 Of the seventy-six contracts in the study, twenty-eight of them limit the scope of the
coverage of the clause, permitting adjustments to the contract or compensation only under designated circumstances. 186
Infrastructure and power agreements demonstrated the most diverse set of arrangements. This might be explained in
part because those agreements cover a wide range of asset-specific investments:
Infrastructure deals cover the range of possible government/private sector relationships, including simple
construction contracts; build, operate, and transfer (BOT) projects; purchases of public firms; and build,
operate, and own investments operating under state regulatory authority. Behind many of these deals are
power purchase agreements which are long-term agreements with the buyers of a project's service--such as
a commercial purchaser of electricity-- that provide funds for payment of project expenses, repayment of
the project's debts, and dividends or distributions to those who hold equity in the project. 187
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*298 4. Hybrid Clauses
Hybrid clauses obligate the state party to attempt to provide exemptions from new laws, or explicitly contemplate
exemptions as a means to compensate the investor for changes in the law. In the Shemberg Study, hybrid clauses appeared
in only six of the seventy-six agreements, and appeared to govern oil and gas projects in the Eastern Europe, Southern
Europe, Middle East and Central Asian regions. 188 One project provides an explicit recognition of the host state's
obligation to implement international standards or to adapt to scientific and technological progress through domestic
legislation. It does not make stabilization applicable to those laws. 189
A second contract in the study was designed to specifically stabilize foreseeable changes in labor law. The stabilization
clause required the government to compensate the investor for all changes to labor and employment laws, even if
consistent with EU standards, until the latter of either 2016 or when the host state becomes a candidate for EU
membership. 190
E. Investors and States Use Diverse Institutional Governance Structures
The stabilization clauses reviewed in the Shemberg Study both support the thesis that states and investors demonstrate
efficient contracting behavior, considering ex ante and ex post probabilities of opportunism and showng significant
diversity in institutional design. The following are short descriptions of different ways parties limit or redistribute risk.
1. Sharing Benefits and Costs of Changes in the Law
In his 2008 article on the deficiencies in bilateral investment treaties *299 and the need for an international commercial
court, Joseph Stiglitz argued that a principal deficiency in modern investment treaties is their asymmetry:
While companies demand compensation when a government-initiated change lowers the value of their
assets, they do not offer to return to the government the increase in value from positive changes. Indeed,
attempts by a government to capture an increase in value resulting from government actions might
themselves be subject to investor suits, unless such recapture is guaranteed in the treaty itself. 191

That may be true for investment treaties, but investor-state agreements appear to demonstrate a higher degree of
sensitivity to the allocation of costs and benefits for changes in the law. Many stabilization clauses are drafted with
the intent of limiting the application of the stabilization clause in some ways, ensuring fairness in its application, and
preserving the long-term mutual interests of the parties, including the distribution of gains (as opposed to losses) from
changes in the law to both parties. 192
Approximately one-third of the limited economic equilibrium contracts and models narrow the scope of coverage
(exempting some laws) and contain a “threshold loss requirement under which no compensation or contract adjustment
is due the investor for changes in law.” 193 A similar percentage of economic equilibrium contracts and models require
the investor to mitigate the costs imposed by change in the law. These provisions make sense for the sectors in which
they are most common: power and road projects.
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2. Renegotiation
Nearly all of the economic equilibrium clauses in the contracts and models in the Shemberg Study provide for an
informal process or contractual duty to negotiate adjustments or compensation before resorting to formal dispute
resolution procedures. 194 Approximately one-third of those clauses identify an independent expert or regulatory body
to verify the costs claimed and to determine which party should bear them. 195 Freezing *300 clauses do not provide for
renegotiation or verification, but instead either prohibit changes in law or require exemption for the investment. Four
of six of the hybrid clauses require the host state to remedy the impacts on the economic equilibrium of the investment.
The other two sample hybrid clauses provide for renegotiation or amendments in good faith when exemptions or
compensation is not possible. Neither the freezing nor hybrid clauses provide for an independent expert or third party
to verify costs or to allocate risk among the parties from the change in law. 196
These clauses provide a rough sketch of how parties are good at minimizing transaction costs. 197 For example, when
Venezuela unilaterally changed the legal structure under which extraction in the Orinoco Belt operated, foreign investors,
relying on the procedures included in the stabilization clause, decided to renegotiate the terms of the concessions. 198
As a result of its abrupt reordering of its investment law (analysts generally agree it was done to expropriate the value
available from the spike in global oil prices), Venezuela has subsequently encountered a reputational loss and difficulty
finding partners for more recent projects. 199
*301 3. Specification of Applicable Laws, Threshold Loss Limits, Foreseeability and Discriminatory Effect
The limited economic equilibrium contracts from developing countries generally limit stabilization coverage through
three mechanisms: (1) designated issue areas for inclusion or exclusion (e.g. tax and environmental laws); (2) stabilization
of laws but limits on coverage by providing a threshold loss requirement (i.e. the investor must suffer a loss of a given
magnitude for the clause to apply); or (3) stabilization of “not foreseeable” changes in law. 200
i. Included and Excluded Laws
Investors and states will negotiate areas of the law that balance state obligations with investor expectations. Two
Latin American and Caribbean power projects provide a detailed list of what is included in the stabilization clause:
fiscal and customs issues, environmental, labor or work safety laws, regulatory laws dealing with electrical power, and
discriminatory laws. 201
Three investment agreements limit stabilization to fiscal issues: a water privatization project, a power project, and an
extractive industry project. 202 Other variations on these kinds of equilibrium clauses include “a road contract that
stabilizes economic status for all laws except inflationary tax law changes,” and a “power contract that explicitly covers
only changes in environmental law and tax and fiscal issues.” 203 Many stabilization clauses cover laws with general
applicability like minimum wage, employment and labor laws, and health and safety laws. 204 “None of the non-OECD
contracts offers an explicit risk-sharing approach for specific changes in law (targeting the industry) that change project
requirements, where the risk cannot be passed on to third parties.” 205
ii. Threshold Loss Limits
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Of the twenty-two limited economic equilibrium clauses in place between investors and non-OECD states, seven (six
power projects and one road project) stabilized all laws but imposed a threshold economic loss requirement on the project
before triggering adjustments or *302 compensation. 206 These threshold requirements limit the applicability of the
stabilization clause, but operate without regard to the nature of the issue-area in which the change in law occurs. 207 “In
these contracts it doesn't matter whether the change in law is foreseeable, or whether it is a law of general applicability,
specific applicability, or for a public policy purpose.” 208
Investment agreements may also impose thresholds of materiality before compensation or adjustment is required or may
leave the standard for compensation to the customary international law norm for a regulatory taking. 209
iii. Foreseeability
Some limited economic equilibrium clauses in contracts between investors and host states stabilize “foreseeable” changes
in laws. 210 Two sample contracts provide stabilization coverage for foreseeable laws that are already passed, but yet
to be in force. 211 Other contracts are more encompassing, stabilizing all unforeseeable changes in law except for tax
changes. 212 In one instance, the parties stabilized laws in force as of years before the contract date. 213
iv. Discriminatory Effect
Of the limited economic equilibrium clauses in the study between foreign investors and a non-OECD state, only two limit
stabilization *303 coverage based strictly on discriminatory or arbitrary actions by the government, the standard under
customary international law discussed above. 214 For example, one Latin American transportation project contract
permits stabilization protection only where the law: (1) is onerous and highly unusual in the industry internationally;
(2) affects the costs of the foreign investor so as to “substantially prevent it from carrying on a significant part of its
business”; and (3) prevents the foreign investor from meeting its senior debt requirements. 215 Even then, “adjustments
can be made to the contract only as needed to make the senior debt payments.” 216
V. EFFICIENT CONTRACTING BETWEEN STATES AND INVESTORS
As the analysis above reveals, host states and foreign investors appear to demonstrate the contracting efficiencies
predicted under generally accepted economic theory. The analysis also answers one of the puzzles arising in one
prominent study conducted by Zach Elkins, Andrew Guzman and Beth Simmons. They predicted followers of the
“obsolescing bargain” school would expect investors in the extractive industries to demand BITs, but they found that
“dependence on extractive industries reduced the probability that a host would make such a commitment.” 217 The
analysis above suggests that investors in the extractive industries are more likely to demand detailed contracts to govern
their investments, not BITs. This is not inconsistent with Elkins', Guzman's, and Simmons' finding that a high number of
“manufacturing” host states signed BITs. The wish to signal openness to garment retailers, for example, may play a role
in why a developing country signs a BIT, but the Coase-Williamson theory would predict investors in light manufacturing
would probably not “demand” BITs, as the sheer competition between manufacturers in several states would make
supplier-shopping relatively inexpensive. BITs would have a marginal or negligible effect.
So, if investors and states generally construct effective mechanisms like stabilization clauses to economize on bounded
rationality and opportunism, what explains BITs? It might be argued, first, that it is the proliferation of BITs that has
facilitated the entry of foreign investors into new markets. Therefore, stabilization clauses represent marginal benefits
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arising from BITs which, in any case, are better at promoting foreign direct investment. 218 A related argument might be
that an underlying BIT operated as a default regime for negotiating the contract. The parties contracted in the shadow
of the BIT just as parties might contract in the *304 shadow of local law.
First, the Shemberg Study does not give us insight as to whether any given contracting relationship was also supported
by a BIT, so it is not possible to investigate that assertion, at least with respect to analyzing the influence of a BIT on an
investment agreement negotiation. 219 Second, it is reasonable to assume an investor is far more aware of a contract it
is directly negotiating than the presence of a BIT (or even a regional investment treaty). 220 The limited evidence shows
investors, from small to very large, are often unaware, ex ante, of BITs or the protections they might provide. Third,
stabilization clauses pre-date the modern explosion of BITs and, in the case of freezing clauses, appear to have moved
through the 1990s and 2000s in more-or-less the same form as they read before. 221 Furthermore, a great deal of evidence
suggests the primary consideration influencing a decision to invest is the size of the target market. 222 If it is true that
companies are anxious to be “first-movers” in sectors of promising economies like Argentina, Mexico, Thailand, or
Egypt, it is probably not true as a general matter that “the rational and risk-adverse investor will choose not to invest at
all or only invest at a higher premium that takes into account the potential risk of the host State reneging on its original
promise.” 223
Lastly, evidence that BITs displace or undermine contracting is limited and mixed. While Exxon invested in the Orinoco
Belt beginning in the 1990s, it did not house its investment in a Dutch holding company until February 2006, after the
Chavez administration declared thirty-two investment agreements illegal under a revised 2001 hydrocarbons law. 224
ConocoPhillips also established a Dutch holding company for its operations in the Orinoco Belt and both are resorting
to ICSID arbitration instead of renegotiating pursuant to their international investment agreements. Italian energy
company ENI, on the other hand, also invests in Venezuela through *305 a Dutch holding company, but renegotiated
its investment as contemplated by the stabilization clause. At the very least, these factors suggest BITs are not facilitating
efficient stabilization clauses.
It might also be argued economic equilibrium clauses are newer than freezing clauses, which are a relic of prenationalization, post-colonial dominance by large investors. 225 According to the Shemberg Study, however, it appears
freezing clauses are still widely used in recent agreements, which surprised many of the lawyers who participated in the
study. 226 Even for those agreements where “path dependence” leads large law firms in the United States and Europe to
include stabilization clauses because they have been inherited from form contracts, the diversity of institutional design
suggests parties engage in bargaining over multiple aspects of the stabilization clause.
A. BITs as a Barrier to Efficient Contracting
In some circumstances, an investor who is aware of BITs may view stabilization clauses, even economic equilibrium
clauses, as threats to the more generous terms offered by BITs; in other circumstances, an investor may reorganize its
corporate structure to avail itself of a BIT that undermines the purpose of the stabilization clause. If the terms of a BIT
provide for compensating an investor for changes in the law resulting in indirect expropriation, but do not conversely
provide for sharing of windfalls with the government, the incentive is to rely on the vaguer and broader promises
contained within the BIT. As one practitioner noted, while his law firm may inherit a freezing clause from a model
contract, this inherited clause may not best secure the client's interest with respect to future changes in a host state's law.
This is instead accomplished by identifying and availing itself of the most favorable terms under a BIT, often using the
Netherlands or Switzerland (the determination of which is affected by tax and other regulatory implications). 227 While
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there is some precedent to suggest a tribunal may require authorizing language from a stabilization clause before issuing
an award, 228 substantial inconsistency in *306 existing decisions and unpredictability for future decisions casts doubt
on whether the existence of a stabilization clause alone can guard against challenges based on one or more BITs. 229
As one practitioner noted with respect to clients in the petroleum sector: “[t]his mechanism [launching an investor-state
claim under a BIT] is available regardless of whether the investor already has a contractual or arbitration arrangement
with the host state or with one of its governmental entities.” 230
Even lengthier BITs, those covering a greater number of investors and investments with greater specificity, are unlikely
to obtain the same level of risk distribution as investment agreements. First, investors shop for the home state whose
BITs offer the greatest benefits for a single transaction or broader operations. 231 Exxon Mobil and ConocoPhillips
are currently *307 engaged in arbitration with Venezuela through Dutch holding companies. 232 Philip Morris
International moved its operations from the U.S. to Switzerland in 2008, organizing its ownership structure to favor Swiss
corporate vehicles and permitting it to take advantage of Switzerland's vast network of short, pro-investor BITs. Second,
investors argue the “most favored nation” provisions in many BITs allow them to use the most favorable procedural
and substantive provisions of other BITs with that host state. 233 As Kenneth Vandevelde concluded:
In effect, BITs allow host states complete discretion either to exclude foreign investment or to admit
it only conditionally, but then they place major restrictions on the ability of the host state to regulate
foreign investment once established . . . . To the extent that they require reliance upon exclusion rather
than regulation of foreign investments, BITs appear to adopt the least economically desirable means
of addressing macroeconomic concerns; just as they choose the least economically desirable means of
addressing the microeconomic concerns. 234

Whether BITs actually deter the formation of more complete contracts is unclear. 235 One measure might be whether
the proliferation of BITs has had a deterrent effect on the use of stabilization clauses, a proposition for which there is, at
best, anecdotal support. 236 It is impossible to definitively conclude stabilization clauses are declining in use; it is likewise
impossible to conclude they are increasing. 237
*308 A second measure may be how investors or their lawyers weigh BITs and investment agreements. One international
arbitrator argued investor-state contracts are only available to “investors with sufficient negotiating power,” although
it is unclear from the available evidence if this is so. 238 A survey of large Swiss enterprises concluded that investment
decisions are made regardless of whether a BIT is in place or not (Switzerland has signed at least 113 BITs). 239 Small
and medium enterprises--constituencies for which international arbitrators, practitioners, scholars and even critics agree
should be the beneficiaries of BITs--showed marginally greater reliance on BITs, but also confirmed they invested in
countries without a BIT. 240 Investment decisions are based on factors including political stability, the availability of
inexpensive labor or natural resources, and the size of the domestic market. There is little (and disputed) evidence BITs
result in increased investment. 241 The size of the target market is apparently the factor that best explains decisions to
invest. 242
B. BITs as Instruments of State Power
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If it is true (1) investors and states demonstrate efficient contracting behavior and (2) BITs may, under some
circumstances, diminish the incentives to negotiate appropriate political risk between parties, then the explanation for
the proliferation of BITs may lie in the origins of BITs themselves: competition between developed countries to achieve
both political and economic objectives. 243 There are good reasons to believe this is so.
First, the web of BITs appears to reflect the overall distribution of power in the international system. In the vast majority
of cases, industrialized countries initiate the formation of investment treaties with developing countries. 244 As one
prominent scholar of BITs observed, “If [host governments'] collaboration is required--as it is for public (national *309
and international) risk insurance or for bilateral investment treaties--it is usually given reluctantly, under pressure, and
with the promise of major investment forthcoming.” 245 Stiglitz notes, “[i]n practice, [BITs] are part of the demands
developed countries impose on developing countries, often as part of trade agreements, acceded to by developing
countries . . . “ 246 Once a country like the Netherlands or Switzerland has decided it wants to formalize protection for its
companies and nationals, it develops a model treaty which will serve as a starting point for all negotiations. In forming
a model treaty, a government will consult all interested governmental and private sector parties to form a national
position. 247 The model determines the agenda and sets the framework for negotiations, and therefore gives the creator
an advantage in the negotiations. 248 The developing countries that do best in negotiations are unsurprisingly the larger
and more powerful ones. For example, India and China both have model BITs that make BIT provisions “subject to or in
accordance with national laws”--a feature not shared by other, arguably less influential, host states. 249 Brazil tends not
to enter into BITs at all. 250 Evidently it is not the case that “developing states almost rush to conclude [BITs] . . . “ 251
Second, the history of BITs appears to reflect global competition between developed countries. The United States
initiated its BIT program after “repeated calls from Congress and the U.S. business community for a U.S. investment
treaty program similar to European programs,” calls reflecting their fears that U.S. investors were losing the global race
to open new markets. 252 The United States entered negotiations for an FTA (with an investment chapter) with South
Korea, manifesting a desire to keep pace with the European Union, which has already concluded a trade treaty with
South Korea. 253 Switzerland competes with other European countries to *310 host the international operations of
multiple industries; an extensive network of BITs is one of many factors that might tip the balance in its favor. 254
Third, BITs are negotiated in close connection with foreign policy objectives. As Alvarez notes, “states have a multitude
of reasons for entering into international obligations--from the political to the highly legalistic.” 255 After the fall of
the Soviet Union, the United States viewed BITs as a way to support its objectives in Eastern Europe where it focused
most of its early attention. 256 Similar diplomatic and political influences drove U.S. overtures toward Colombia and
Rwanda. 257 While the United States uses BITs and the investment chapters of FTAs in close connection with foreign
policy objectives, 258 Switzerland's objective appears driven by the principle of opening up developing world economies
to its investors. As the Swiss Secretariat for Economic Affairs stated in an interview, the goal of the ministry is to sign
a BIT with every non-OECD country. 259
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has argued the presence of stabilization clauses in contracts between investors and host states provides
some evidence that these parties demonstrate efficient contracting behavior. While more research is required in order to
fully understand the relationship between stabilization clauses and investment treaties, certain factors, including investor
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awareness of BITs, suggest investment treaties are often unnecessary and may erode the efficiencies achieved through
stabilization clauses. 260 If BITs are not efficiency-enhancing mechanisms promoting investment, they may be, as critics
argue, economically unjustified subsidies imposed upon developing countries as part of a global *311 competition for
new markets and new capital. That developing countries sign BITs in order to compete in sectors like light manufacturing
may be only a small part of the story. 261
The future of BITs is uncertain. Many commentators suggest that, as developing countries like the BRICs become
great powers, the number will increase. 262 However, Pakistan, South Africa, and Venezuela have reecntly exhibited
an interest in terminating or renegotiating BITs. 263 Even if investors ultimately demand BITs as their primary
investment protection, this Article may lay the groundwork for better negotiations at the BIT level. 264 States may, for
example, include historically excluded constituencies at negotiations, like representatives from Ministries of Health or
Environment, as investors frequently target their administrative measures. 265 Principles from economic equilibrium
clauses including exemptions for environment, health, and labor laws also may be incorporated into the broader language
of BITs with more specificity than “non-precluded measures” clauses now provide. Currently, many BITs place health
and safety provisions in ambiguous preamble statements or *312 couch them in non-binding terms. 266
More certain is that the current literature on BITs does not sufficiently discuss the full range of issues on which existing
evidence might provide insight, including how the mobility of capital shapes competition between states and basic aspects
of domestic corporate law; the nuances lurking behind and within BITs not reflected by their aggregate numbers; and
the complicated interactions between politics, diplomacy, and investment. Further consideration is therefore necessary
to understand more fully the role BITs play in growth and development.
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U.N. Doc. A/RES/29/3281 (Dec. 12, 1974) (emphasizing each State has a right “[t]o nationalize, expropriate or transfer
ownership of foreign property” provided compensation is paid to the State pursuant to the State's laws, and disputes regarding
compensation will be resolved under domestic law unless another agreement has been reached) available at http://daccessdds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/738/83/IMG/NR073883.pdf?OpenElement; Yelpaala, supra note 39, at 246
(reviewing that the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties when read in its entirety “constituted a significant departure from
what was considered by capital exporting countries to be the customary international law standard expressed in the U.N.
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General Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, Resolution 1803 adopted in 1963,” giving
States free reign to adopt policies over their resources).

47

Alvarez, supra note 42, at 49-50. He notes that 27% of BITs are executed between developing countries but (1) it is not clear
how many of those are generated by BRICS and (2) 90% of arbitration disputes are between Western investors and developing
world governments. See Van Harten, supra note 1, at 26.

48

Alvarez, supra note 42, at 41-42 (citations omitted).

49

Stiglitz, supra note 1, at 482. The WTO itself is viewed as a multilateral agreement that succeeded where a patchwork of
bilateral or regional treaties could not. After its formation, countries have still used bilateral treaties to obtain benefits
they could not get through the WTO. See Judith Goldstein & Richard Steinberg, Regulatory Shift: the Rise of Judicial
Liberalization at the WTO, in The Politics of Global Regulation 211 (Ngaire Woods & Walter Mattli, eds. 2009).

50

See Susan Franck, Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Treaty Arbitration, and the Rule of Law, 19 Pac. McGeorge Global
Bus. & Dev. L.J. 337, 348-49 (2007) (citing Salacuse and Sullivan's findings that when developing countries sign BITs with
OECD countries, FDI increases and that increase is likely to be larger if the country is the U.S.); See Eric Neumayer & Laura
Spess, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries?, 33 World Dev. 1567
(2005).

51

Franck, supra note 50, at 349 (“Analysts from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),
the World Bank, and elsewhere have conducted research suggesting that investment treaties have a minimal impact on
foreign investment.”); Mayeda, supra note 32, at 274 (noting that there have been large awards in cases involving BITs
placing a substantial burden on countries such as Argentina and the Slovak Republic, but more problematically “[t]he legal
and macroeconomic consequences of broad investment rights are largely unknown”) (change in original); Mary HallwardDrimeier, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract Foreign Direct Investment? Only a Bit and They Could Bite (June 2003),
http://econ.worldbnank.org/files/29143_ wps3121.pdf; Vahe Lskavyan & Mariana Spatareanu, Host Country's Governance
and the Size of Foreign Investors, 100 Econ. Letters 258 (2008).

52

Bernard Hoekman & Richard Newfarmer, Preferential Trade Agreements, Investment Disciplines and Investment Flows, 39
J. World Trade 949, 966 (2005).

53

Broches, supra note 24, at 76; Wolfgang Peter, Arbitration and Renegotiation of International Investment Agreements 343,
360 (2nd ed. 1995).

54

Id. at 343.

55

Id. at 344.

56

Rudolf Dolzer & Margrete Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties 12-13 (1995); see Lauge Skovgaard Poulsen, Vale Columbia
Center on Sustainable International Investment, Political Risk Insurance and Bilateral Investment Treaties: A View from
Below, 27 Colum. FDI Perspectives (Aug. 2, 2010), http:// www.vcc.columbia.edu/content/political-risk-insurance-andbilateral-investment-treaties-view-below (examining the overlap between political risk insurance and BITs in government
provided agencies, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency and through private companies).

57

Peter, supra note 53, at 345.

58

Id. at 359.

59

Id.

60

Of Coups and Coverage, The Economist (Apr. 4, 2007), http:// www.economist.com/node/8967224.
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61

MIGA Member Countries, Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, http://www.miga.org/about/index_sv.cfm?stid=1695
(last visited Mar. 1, 2011).

62

Overview, Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, http:// www.miga.org/about/index_sv.cfm?stid=1736 (last visited Mar.
1, 2011).

63

Peter, supra note 53, at 363.

64

Id. at 364-65.

65

Frequently Asked Questions, Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, http://www.miga.org/quickref/index_sv.cfm?
stid=1587&pv=s#con9 (last visited Mar. 1, 2011). These interventions occurred in Argentina and Indonesia.

66

Id.

67

Id.

68

Ingrid Detter De Lupis, Finance and Protection of Investments in Developing Countries 156 (2nd ed. 1987).

69

Susan Rose-Ackerman & Jim Rossi, Disentangling Deregulatory Takings, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1435, 1473 (2000).

70

Id.; Detter De Lupis, supra note 68, at 172-73.

71

Rose-Ackerman & Rossi, supra note 69.

72

Jason Webb Yackee, Do We Really Need BITs? Toward a Return to Contract in International Investment Law, 3 Asian J.
WTO & Int'l Health L. & Pol'y 121, 125 (2008) [hereinafter International Investment Law].

73

Id. at 131.

74

See infra notes 90-134.

75

See, e.g., Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Economics, Organization & Management (1992); Michael D. Whinston, Assessing
the Property Rights and Transaction-Cost Theories of Firm Scope, 91 Am. Econ. Rev. 184, 184 (2001); Armen A. Alchian &
Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 777, 783 (1972); Michael
C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J.
Fin. Econ. 305, 312 (1976).

76

Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386, 386-405 (1937); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the
Nature of the Firm, 98 J. Pol. Econ. 1119, 1121 (1990); See David M. Driesen & Shubha Ghosh, The Functions of Transaction
Costs: Rethinking Transaction Cost Minimization in a World of Friction, 47 Ariz. L. Rev. 61, 80 (2005).

77

Harold Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, in The Nature of the Firm: Origins, Evolution and Development 160
(Oliver Williamson & Sidney G. Winter eds. 1991) [hereinafter Nature of the Firm].

78

Ronald Coase, The Firm, the Market, and the Law 6 (1988). Coase did not actually coin the term “transaction costs” which
is generally attributed to Kenneth Arrow, The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market
versus Nonmarket Allocation, in The Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditure: The PPB System 59-73 (1969).

79

See, e.g., Oliver Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations, 61 Am. Econ. Rev. 112,
114 (1971).

80

See Scott Masten, A Legal Basis for the Firm, 4 J. L., Econ., and Org. 181 (1988).

81

For example, Oliver Hart and John Moore argued that the firm's ownership of assets (e.g., access to a certain machine or
access to client lists) allowed it to establish incentives for workers to act in the firm's interest vis-à-vis the opportunity to
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specialize skills. Because workers need access to these assets to improve the value of their skills to the firm and thus their
bargaining position relative to the owner, the owner can indirectly encourage them to act in his or her interest relative to an
arms-length contract where the owner negotiated with a second owner who directly employed the workers. Oliver Hart & John
Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. Pol. Econ. 1119, 1121 (1990). Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales
modified this thesis to emphasize the access component of the Hart-Moore theory. They argued that access, not ownership,
is key to encouraging optimal specific investment by workers. By carefully structuring access to key assets (broadly defined),
firms may not only encourage specific investment by workers through the bilateral relationship with the owner, but may also
create a “rat race” between workers to specialize. Raghuram Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm, 113
Q. J. Econ. 387, 388 (1998).

82

See, e.g., Oliver Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism 365-84 (1985) (tracing the shift in American antitrust
enforcement against mergers) [hereinafter EIC]; Armen Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs and
Economic Organization, 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 777 (1972); Victor Goldberg, Regulation and Administered Contracts, 7 Bell
J. Econ. 426 (1976); Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents,
and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J. L. & Econ. 297, 297-98 (1978); Richard Posner, Problematics of Moral and
Legal Theory 239 (1999); Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement To Facilitate Coasean
Trade, 104 Yale L.J. 1027, 1030-32 (1995).

83

Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & Econ. 1, 1-44 (1960); Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Influence, in Nature
of the Firm, supra note 77, at 63 (“Although the attention given to my argument in ‘The Nature of the Firm’ in the 1970s and
1980s derived in part from the interest in my views generated by the ‘Social Cost’ article and the greater appreciation of the
importance of transaction costs which it brought about, the writings of Williamson must have had the same effect.”).

84

See, e.g., G. March & Herbert A. Simon, Organizations 140-41 (1958).

85

See, e.g., Karl Llewelyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence--The Next Stop, 30 Colum. L. Rev. 431 (1930).

86

Oliver Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications (1983) [hereinafter Markets]. For an
exposition of a competing view of the firm, see Kathleen R. Connor & C.K. Prahalad, A Resource-based Theory of the Firm:
Knowledge Versus Opportunism, 7 Org. Sci. 477 (1996); Kathleen Connor, A Historical Comparison of Resource-Based
Theory and Five Schools of Thought Within Industrial Organization Economics: Do We Have a New Theory of the Firm?”
17 J. Mgmt. 121, 121-54 (1991).

87

Roy Radner argues that “bounded rationality” is comprised of two “costs”--those associated with observation,
communication and computation and “indeterminacy” like “not knowing the implications of everything that one knows.
Radner concludes that “economists will not make further progress on the theory of the organization of the firm until we can
deal more effectively with both of these phenomena.” Roy Radner, Bounded Rationality, Indeterminacy and the Theory of
the Firm, 106 Econ. J. 1360, 1360-61 (1996).

88

See generally Williamson, Markets, supra note 86.

89

Oliver E. Williamson, Internal Economic Organization, in Perspectives on the Economics of organization 9, 15 (Oliver E.
Williamson, Sven-Erik Sjöstrand & Jan Johanson eds., 1989) (citing Herbert Simon, Models of Man 199 (1957)); see also
Mark Casson, The Firm and the Market 41 (1987) (criticizing Williamson's “tortuous terminology”).

90

See D. Gordon Smith & Brayden King, Contracts as Organizations, 51 Ariz. L. Rev. 1, 17 (2009) (citing Oliver Hart, Firms,
Contracts and Financial Structure 23 (1995)) (“The degree to which contracts are incomplete is not completely foreordained,
but depends in part on the tradeoff between the anticipated hazards of ex post opportunism and the costs of ex ante design.”);
see also Keith J. Crocker & Kenneth J. Reynolds, The Efficiency of Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Air Force
Engine Procurement, 24 Rand J. Econ. 126, 127 (1993) (“Were contracting costless, it would be possible in principle to design
arrangements complete enough to circumscribe all surplus-eroding redistributive tactics and intricate enough to mitigate
investment distortions. In practice, however, the costs of identifying contingencies and devising responses increase rapidly
in complex or uncertain environments, placing economic limits on the ability of agents to draft and implement elaborate
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contractual agreements. When designing a contract, the parties may mitigate ex post opportunism and investment distortions
by the use of more complete agreements, but at the cost of increased resources dedicated to crafting the document a priori.
As a consequence, environmental characteristics that generate increased contracting costs should result in efficient contracts
being less complete, whereas conditions that exacerbate the potential for ex post inefficiencies should lead to more exhaustive
agreements.”).

91

Oliver E. Williamson, The Law of Economic Organization, in Nature of the Firm, supra note 77, at 92-93; but see Peter J.
Boettke, The Elgar Companion to Austrian Economics 175 (1998) (“[T]he transaction cost literature shows its neoclassical
legacy in posing the problem of the firm in terms of a maximization problem perceived ex visu of a point in time. In presentday transaction cost economics, one explains particular business institutions we observe in the world as having arisen to
minimize the sum of production costs and transaction costs. Those costs are normally understood implicitly to have arisen
from the environment in existence at the moment under analysis. Seldom does the theory give thought to the possibility that
organizational forms may be influenced as much by environments that exist only as future possibilities, imagined or feared.”).

92

Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471,
1477 (1998); David J. Teece, Vertical Integration & Vertical Divestiture in the U.S. Oil Industry 31 (1976).

93

Williamson, Internal Economic Organization, supra note 89, at 15.

94

Evgeny V. Popov & Victoria L. Simonova, Forms of Opportunism Between Principals and Agents, 12 Int'l Advances in Econ.
Research 115, 115 (2006).

95

See D. Gordon Smith, The Branding Effects of Contracts, 12 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 189, n.20 (2007) (citing Conrad S. Ciccotello
et al., Research and Development Alliances: Evidence from a Federal Contracts Repository, 47 J.L. & Econ. 123, 127 (2004)
(citing Scott E. Masten et al., The Costs of Organization, 7 J.L. Econ. & Org. 1, 9 (1991))) (“Masten et al. suggest the possibility
of holdup in the absence of asset specificity. They use the term ‘temporal specificity’ to describe a situation in which ‘timely
performance is critical, [and] delay becomes a potentially effective strategy for exacting price concessions.”).

96

Henry Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise 40; Gregory Jackson, Comparative Corporate Governance: Sociological
Perspectives, in The Political Economy of the Company 265, 268-69 (John Parkinson, Andrew Gamble & Gavin Kelly eds.,
2000).

97

Bruce Kogut & Udo Zander, Knowledge of the Firm and the Evolutionary Theory of the Multinational Corporation, 24 J.
Int'l Bus. Stud. 625, 639 (1993).

98

Tony McGuinness, Markets and Managerial Hierarchies, in Markets, Hierarchies & Networks 66, 69 (G. Thompson, et al.
eds., 1994).

99

Williamson, EIC, supra note 82, at 47. Williamson adopts concepts of ex ante and ex post opportunism from insurance
literature. Parties are unable to “distinguish between risks and the unwillingness of poor risks candidly to disclose their true
risk condition.” Failure of parties to take “appropriate risk-mitigating actions” gives rise to ex post execution problems. Id.
Contra Andreas A. Papandreou, Externality and Institutions 253 (1994) (explaining the tendency for this analysis to produce
the unsatisfactory conclusion that “any institution that exists must be optimal otherwise wealth-maximizing agents would
have exploited any ‘attainable’ improvements”).

100

Williamson, Internal Economic Organization, supra note 89, at 16.

101

Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Microeconomics 2 (2004).

102

But see Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 Am. Soc. Rev. 55 (1963); Robert
C. Ellickson, Order without law: how Neighbors Settle Disputes (1991) for empirical studies that show that both formal and
informal contracts play mediating and expectation-converging roles.
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103

Oliver Hart, An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, in Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the
Present and Beyond 154, 158 (Oliver E. Williamson ed., 1995). Contra D. Bruce Johnsen, The Quasi-Rent Structure of Private
Enterprise: A Transaction Cost Theory, 44 Emory L.J. 1277, 1316 (1995) (“Although this example adequately served the
authors' purpose in explaining the choice between vertical integration and long-term contracting, the distinction between the
specialized quasi-rent and the appropriable specialized quasi-rent is somewhat misleading. In theory, there are many possible
dimensions of asset specificity and therefore many alternative measures of an asset's specialized quasi-rent. At the time the
investment is made, an asset can be specific to a given user, to a given function, to a given location, et cetera. Which measure
is appropriate depends on which alternative states of the world are being examined.”).

104

See generally Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Ian Ayers, Economic Rationales for Mediation, 80 Va. L. Rev. 323 (1994); Scott
R. Peppet, Contract Formation in Imperfect Markets: Should We Use Mediators in Deals?, 19 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol.
283 (2004). But see Mark Klock, Financial Options, Real Options, and Legal Options: Opting to Exploit Ourselves and What
We Can Do About It, 55 Ala. L. Rev. 63, 102 (2003) (arguing that ADR may be more expensive than litigation in varying
circumstances); Oliver Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 Am. Econ. Rev. 519,
526 (1983). Cf. Masten, supra note 80, at 207 (arguing that common law doctrines recognize multiple “modes” of transactions,
which “may also warrant the establishment of alternative sets of norms and conventions (namely, institutions) to govern
disparate clusters of transactions”).
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Oliver E. Williamson, Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives, 36 Admin. Sci.
Q. 269, 271 (1991) [hereinafter Comparative Economic Organization].
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Brower & Schill, supra note 6, at 478.
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Smith & King, supra note 90, at 17-18.

108

Klein, Crawford & Alchain, supra note 82, at 308; see also Williamson, EIC, supra note 82, at 114.
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Klein, Crawford & Alchain, supra note 82, at 308-09.

110

Id. at 309.

111

Williamson, EIC, supra note 82, at 115.

112

Klein, Crawford & Alchain, supra note 82, at 310.

113

But see Oliver D. Hart, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm, 4 J. L. Econ. & Org. 119, 125-35 (1988) (arguing
that the GM-Fisher Body example proves more about transfer of property rights than other components of Williamson's
theory like resolving disputes by fiat and correcting asymmetries of information.).

114

See Barak Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive Theory of Private Ordering, 104 Colum.
L. Rev. 2328, 2329 (2004).

115

See The Bigger Picture, Economist (Oct. 17, 2009), http:// www.economist.com/node/14632614 (reporting on Williamson's
receiving the Nobel Prize for Economic Sciences). But see Andreas A. Papandreou, Externality and Institutions 253 (Oxford
University Press 1994). While the critique of the traditional notion of efficiency has been well taken, the ramifications of
incorporating organizational costs in the notion of optimality remain far from clear. A particularly discouraging feature
of such models, when combined with the behavioral assumption made, seems to be that they lead to the “‘unpalatable
conclusion’... that any institution that exists must be optimal, otherwise ‘wealth-maximizing agents would have exploited any
‘attainable’ improvements.”' Malcolm Rutherford, Andreas Papandreou's Externality and Institutions, 33 J. Econ. Literature
1981, 1983 (1995) (book review) (quoting Papandreou, supra).
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and Economic Performance 55 (1990); see also Carol Rose, Trust in the Mirror of Betrayal, 75 B.U. L. Rev. 531, 537 (1995);
Michael J. Meurer, Law, Economics, and the Theory of the Firm, 52 Buff. L. Rev. 727, 734 (2004).

117

See Joy Mining Machinery, Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11, Award on Jurisdiction, P 15 (Aug.
6, 2004). In Joy Mining, a company incorporated under the laws of England and Wales agreed to supply mining systems and
supporting equipment to an agency of the Egyptian government. Joy Mining provided letters of guarantee for contractual
obligations at the Bank of Alexandria. The contract provided for the schedule and conditions for release of these guarantees
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did not constitute an “investment” for purposes of jurisdiction (under more recent decisions, it is questionable whether a
current ICSID panel would refuse jurisdiction), the episode is one of many that shows how foreign investors and host states
exchange “hostages” to promote exchange (in this case, the hostages were the letters of guarantee held at a bank in the host
state). Markus W. Gehring & Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, Sustainable Development in World Trade Law 405 (2005).

118

Rajeev J. Sawant, The Economics of Large-Scale Infrastructure FDI: The Case of Project Finance, 41 J Int'l Bus. Stud.
1036, 1036-56 (2009); see Judgment the Gabcìkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia) 1997 I.C.J. 92 (Sept. 25) (“In
the field of environmental protection, vigilance and prevention are required on account of the often irreversible character
of damage to the environment and of the limitation inherent in the very mechanism of reparation of this type of damage.”)
(quoted in Philippe Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law 247 n.65 (2003)); Anoop Madhok, Reassessing
the Fundamentals and Beyond: Ronald Coase, the Transaction Cost and Resource-Based Theories of the Firm and the
Institutional Structure of Production, 23 Strategic Mgmt. J. 535, 535-50 (2002); Nicolai J. Foss, Bounded Rationality and Tacit
Knowledge in the Organizational Capabilities Approach: An Assessment and a Re-evaluation, 12 Indus. & Corp. Change
185 (2003).
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Kenneth Vandevelde, The Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 41 Harv. Int'l L.J. 469, 473 (2000).

120

John Dunning, Multinational Enterprise and the Global Economy (1993) (arguing that corporations located in a foreign
location must possess an ownership (O) advantage (e.g. superior technology), a locational (L) advantage (e.g. available skills)
and have reasons to internalize (I) operations rather than outsource and license foreign firms).
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Ravi Ramamurti & Jonathan Doh, Rethinking Foreign Infrastructure Investment in Developing Countries, 39 J. World Bus.
151, 162 (2004).
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Vandevelde, The Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 119, at 475.
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Schill, supra note 43.

124

Wäelde & Ndi, supra note 28, at 224 (noting the political tensions that can arise in the non-renewable natural resources
industry between investor companies and domestic enterprises in relation to tax burdens).

125

Stiglitz, supra note 1, at 478 (citing petroleum contracts in Alaska and Alabama); see Judith Royster, Practical Sovereignty,
Political Sovereignty, and the Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act, 12 Lewis & Clark L. Rev.
1065, 1085 (2008) (detailing Peabody Coal's efforts to reduce the royalty rate on a coal deposit in Navajo territory through
manipulation of the royalty rate-setting process). See also Duke Energy Int'l Peru Inv. Ltd. 1 v. Republic of Peru, Award on
the Merits, 18 August 2008, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/28; see also Kevin T. Jacobs & Matthew G. Paulson, The Convergence
of Renewed Nationalization, Rising Commodities and “Americanization” in International Arbitration and the Need for More
Rigorous Legal and Procedural Defenses, 43 Tex. Int'l L.J. 359, 372 (2008) (detailing how newer investment agreements
address some of these opportunism risks). In their current dispute, the Government of Venezuela accuses Exxon Mobil of
characterizing some oil as “bitumen” in order to reduce amounts due under their contract.
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Ramamurti & Doh, supra note 121, at 162.
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See Paul E. Comeaux & N. Stephan Kinsella, Reducing Political Risk in Developing Countries: Bilateral Investment Treaties,
Stabilization Clauses, and MIGA & OPIC Investment Insurance, 15 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 1, 4-5 (1994) (discussing
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See Ramamurti & Doh, supra note 121, at 157-58.
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Risk 130-32 (1997).

150

Gaetan Verhoosel, Foreign Direct Investment and Legal Constraints on Domestic Environmental Policies: Striking A
“Reasonable” Balance between Stability and Change, 29 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 451, 453 (1998).

151

Shemberg, supra note 27 (citing G.R. Delaume, Transnational Contracts: Application Law and Settlement of Disputes: Law
and Practice, Booklet 8 301, 307-09 (July 1983)).

152

Id. at 2.

153

Id. P 125.

154

Cotula, supra note 28, at 162 (citing Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic, 53 ILR 389 P 59 (1977));
Kuwait v. American Indep. Oil Co., Arbitration Award, 21 ILM 976 (1982); AGIP Co. v. Congo, Arbitration Award, 21 ILM
726 (1982); S.K. Chatterjee, The Stabilization Clause Myth in Investment Agreements, 5 J. Int'l Arb. 97, 98 (1988); Verhoosel,
supra note 150, at 456.

155

The study also conducted a literature review and a review of reported contract and investor-state disputes that may be relevant
to understanding the legal enforceability of such clauses as well as interviews with negotiators, lenders and lawyers who
negotiate investment contracts or litigate disputes for states and investors, and with nongovernmental organizations members
who have conducted research on stabilization clauses. Shemberg, supra note 27.

156

Id.

157

There is the additional factor that these law firms, at least with respect to international arbitration, are highly Americanized.
Kevin T. Jacobs & Matthew G. Paulson, The Convergence of Renewed Nationalization, Rising Commodities and
“Americanization” in International Arbitration and the Need for More Rigorous Legal and Procedural Defenses, 43 Tex.
Int'l L.J. 359, 368 (2008).

158

After reviewing the data summarized in the Shemberg Study, I interviewed six attorneys (two partners and four senior
associates) at large private law firms in Washington, D.C. to obtain at least anecdotal evidence as to 1) the extent that
international arbitration practitioners were involved in pre-investment advising and 2) the relationship between stabilization
clauses and BITs.

159

Shemberg, supra note 27, at 42-43.

160

There is some reason to believe that certain international lenders are more likely to require stabilization clauses, especially
freezing clauses. Wäelde & Ndi, supra note 28, at 228-29 (emphasizing that a financial institution's “core concern is the ability
of the project to repay its debt.”) .

161

Shemberg, supra note 27, P 47, at 13.

162

Id. P 25.

163

Id. P 63.
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164

Wäelde & Ndi, supra note 28, at 218-19 (“[I]n the last ten to twenty years, stabilization clauses have undergone a substantial
revolution... Instead of targeting the legislative power of the state founded on sovereignty, these commitments are designed to
set up a contractual mechanism of allocating the financial effect of political risk to the state enterprise.”); see also Mohamed
Al Faruque, Typologies, Efficacy and Political Economy of Stabilization Clauses: A Critical Appraisal, 4 Transnat'l Dispute
Mgmt. 31-33 (2007).

165

Shemberg, supra note 27, PP 26-27, at 6-7.

166

Id. at 8.

167

Id. at Summary of Analysis.

168

Id. P 22.

169

Id. P 31, at 8.

170

Cotula, supra note 28, at 160.

171

Shemberg, supra note 27, at 15 fig. 5.1. The contracts and models analyzed include eleven from Sub-Saharan Africa; fourteen
from East Asia and Pacific; sixteen from the Middle East and North Africa; ten from Eastern Europe, Southern Europe and
Central Asia; five from South Asia; nineteen from Latin America and the Caribbean; and thirteen from OECD countries (other
than Turkey, which is included in Eastern Europe, Southern Europe and Central Asia). Figure 5.1 shows the distribution of
contracts and models used in the study.

172

Id. at pt. 6.1.

173

One investment agreement with a sub-Saharan state provided an initial duration of fifty years with an option of extending
for another fifty years at the discretion of the investor. In addition, the investment is exempt from all host state taxes except
the royalty payment due under the agreement. Id.

174

Id. at 23, fig. 6.3.

175

Id. at pt. 6.1.

176

Shemberg, supra note 27, at 17-19, pt. 6.1.

177

Id. P 118, at 33 (“It is less clear that the stabilization practice in non-OECD countries, other than those of Sub-Saharan Africa,
can be explained by country risk perception. Of the remaining non-OECD regions, the ratings are quite mixed. According to
Moody's historical data, 7 countries in East Asia and Pacific obtained investment grade, 4 speculative grade, and 3 were not
rated. For the Middle East and North Africa, there were 8 countries with investment grade, 4 with speculative grade, and 5
not rated. For Southern, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 3 countries obtained investment grade, 3 speculative grade, and
4 were not rated. In Latin America, 1 country obtained investment grade, 15 speculative grade, and 3 were not rated. And in
South Asia, 1 country obtained investment and 4 speculative grade.”).

178

Id.

179

Wäelde & Ndi, supra note 28, at 224 (explaining that more often political tension arises in the exploitation of non-renewable
natural resources industry because the tax burden is raised on the standard fiscal regime, but only foreign companies are
permitted or able to gain favorable tax provisions, such as accelerated depreciation, under the BIT which in turn is perceived
as a discriminatory favor to benefit foreign investors at the expense of domestic enterprises).

180

Shemberg, supra note 27, PP 55-58, at 15-16. Six of the investment agreements in the Shemberg Study contain limited freezing
clauses of which four had fiscal freezing clauses. Two contracts from the Middle East and North Africa in oil and gas, one
power contract from South Asia, and one Sub-Saharan African mining contract. The two other limited freezing clauses
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included at least some nonfiscal issues. One from Eastern, Southern Europe and Central Asia for a gas pipeline project and
one from Latin America and the Caribbean in transportation.

181

Id. at 18 tbl. 6.1.

182

As Cotula notes, the 1997 AGIP/British Petroleum/Etal-Kazakhstan “Kashagan” Production-Sharing Agreement requires
parties to take action to restore the “overall economic benefit” of the agreement should any change in Kazakhstani law have
a material adverse effect on the investor's economic benefits. Cotula, supra note 28, at 161 n.14.

183

Shemberg, supra note 27, P 69, at 21.

184

Id. P 20, at 5.

185

Id. P 81, at 25.

186

Id. P 83, at 25.

187

Rose-Ackerman & Rossi, supra note 69, at 1470 n.123 (“Under a BOT arrangement, the contractor builds the plant and then
sells the power that is produced for a period of time. Once one is committed to a risky environment, more control over the
environment may be preferred to less. In some cases the firm may only consider the extremes of equipment sales or a BOT
project. An intermediate case where the firm accepts much of the risk and has little control over its magnitude may be the
worst possible strategy. Thus the structure of the deals reflects guesses about the stability of the political regime and the legal
system.”).

188

Shemberg, supra note 27, P 85, at 26. Some appear to have been modeled after the ECT.

189

Id. P 87, at 26 (“The above [stabilization] provisions do not apply in cases where the purpose of the adoption of a new Law
or the amendment of a Law after the Date of Signing of the Concession Contract is to implement International Standards or
technical, environmental, security or policing standards in adapting to scientific or technical progress.”).

190

Id. at 27 n.42 (“‘The State Authorities shall take all actions available to them to restore the Economic Equilibrium established
under the Project Agreements if and to the extent the Economic Equilibrium is disrupted or negatively affected, directly or
indirectly, as a result of any change ... in ... Law (... excluding any ... Law(s) ... with respect to cultural heritage, health,
safety, the environment and ... employment/labour relations ... to the extent such ... Laws do not impose ... conditions
more onerous than those generally observed by the member states of the European Union respecting cultural heritage,
health, safety, the environment and ... employment/labour relations .... The reference to ‘employment/labour relations' in
this Section 7.2(x) shall only apply after the later of (i) 1 January 2016, and (ii) the date the State becomes an Official
EU Candidate ....’ Georgian Caspian South Caucuses Pipeline project, available at http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?
categoryId=9006628&contentId=7013497.”).

191

Stiglitz, supra note 1, at 457.

192

Shemberg, supra note 27, P 95, at 28 (“For example, over 25 percent of the economic equilibrium contracts in the study
contain stabilization provisions that apply in both the investor's and the host state's favor. For changes in law that create a
windfall, lower costs, or higher revenues, the host state shares in the benefit. None of the freezing or hybrid contracts contains
such a clause.”).

193

Id. P 96.

194

Id. P 97; Cotula supra note 28, at 165 (“In the case of economic equilibrium clauses, parties are under an obligation to negotiate
in good faith so as to restore the economic equilibrium following regulatory change; but they are not under an obligation to
reach an agreement.”).

195

Shemberg, supra note 27, P 97, at 28.
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196

Id.

197

Klaus Peter Berger, Renegotiation and Adaptation of International Investment Contracts: The Role of Contract Drafters
and Arbitrators, 36 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 1347, 1359-60 (2003) (citing the Vietnam-Laslo oil concession clause, “‘If after the
Effective Date, new law(s) and/or regulation(s) are introduced in Vietnam adversely affecting CONTRACTOR'S interest, or
any amendments to existing laws and/or regulations are made then the Parties shall meet and consult each other and shall
make the necessary changes to this Agreement to ensure that CONTRACTOR is restored to the same economic conditions
which would have prevailed if the new law and/or regulation or amendment had not been introduced.’ In Article 11, the
contract contains an arbitration agreement for ‘all disputes arising out of or in connection to the contract.’ In Article 17.9
the parties are granted the right to present all ‘questions, which are in substance of a technical nature’ to an ‘independent
expert of international reputation.”’).

198

Thomas J. Pate, Evaluating Stabilization Clauses in Venezuela's Strategic Association Agreements for Heavy-Crude
Extraction in the Orinoco Belt: The Return of a Forgotten Contractual Risk Reduction Mechanism for the Petroleum
Industry, 40 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 347, 374 (2008-2009) (“The stabilization clause itself provided that in the event that
the ‘Foreign Party’ deemed that an event that would cause a material adverse impact had occurred, it would notify PDVSA,”
the Venezuelan state-owned entity that “would cooperate with the Foreign Party to pursue legal action and ‘negotiate in good
faith compensatory damages and/or possible modifications to the Agreement designed to restore the economic benefit that
the Foreign Party would have received had the [event] not occurred.”’).

199

See Foreign Investment in Venezuela Decreases in the Third Quarter, El Universal Daily News (Nov. 18, 2008),
http:// english.eluniversal.com/2008/11/18/en_eco_esp_foreign-investment-i_ 18A2134141.shtml; see also Amy L. Chua, The
Privatization-Nationalization Cycle: The Link Between Markets and Ethnicity in Developing Countries, 95 Colum. L. Rev.
223, 288 (1995) (implying that regulatory interventions can help modify the swings between nationalization and privatization).

200

Shemberg, supra note 27, P 104, at 30. Limited economic equilibrium clauses from the OECD contracts in the study generally
limit stabilization coverage to laws that are discriminatory toward the investor, and in some cases offer risk-sharing or
compensation for specific laws pertaining to the sector or project. Laws for public policy issues such as safety and security,
even if discriminatory toward the investor, often are explicitly excluded from stabilization. Id. PP 88, 96.

201

Id. P 107.

202

Id. P 111.

203

Id.

204

Id. P 113.

205

Id.

206

Id. P 105.

207

Id.

208

Id.

209

Cotula supra note 28, at 166-67 (“Overall, the case law suggests that a regulatory taking only occurs when regulation entails
‘substantial’ deprivation of property rights that is such to render these rights economically ‘useless,’ as evidenced by criteria
such as control over the investment, or interference with day-to-day management or with payment of dividends.”). See also
Pope & Talbot Inc. v. The Government of Canada, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, P 100 (Apr. 10, 2001), available at http://
www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/Award_ Merits-e.pdf.

210

Shemberg, supra note 27, P 109, at 31.
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211

Id. (“One is a Latin American power contract that covers all laws, except income tax, but includes enacted laws not yet in
force. Similarly, a road contract for South Asia covers all laws, including those known at the time of the contract but not
yet in force.”).

212

Id. P 108.

213

Id. P 110 (“The first contract for the project dates from the 1990s and provides economic equilibrium for all environmental law
changes having an economic impact after one year prior to its signature. The 2000s contract maintains the original reference
date of the 1990s contract for environmental changes in law in its equilibrium clause. This means that pursuant to the later
contract, the investor is entitled to adjustments in the contract or compensation for all changes to environmental laws that
make greater requirements than those in force 10 years prior, even if a foreseeable change in environmental law in the 2000s
would differ from what was foreseeable in the 1990s.”).

214

Id. P 112.

215

Id.

216

Id.

217

Elkins, Guzman & Simmons, supra note 11, at 843.

218

Schill, supra note 43, at 23.

219

The authors of the study are bound by confidentiality agreements even if they knew more about the contracts (including the
parties) which in many cases they did not.

220

Franck, supra note 50, at 364.

221

Shemberg, supra note 27, P 26, at 6-7.

222

U.N. Conference on Trade & Development, Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Mid-1990s, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/
ITE/IIT/7, U.N. Sales No. E.98.II.D.8 (1998); see Mary Hallward-Driemeier, World Bank, Do Bilateral Investment
Treaties Attract FDI? Only a Bit...and They Could Bite (June 2003), available at http://elibrary.worldbank.org/docserver/
download/3121.pdf? expires=1299043967&id= id&accname=guest&checksum=1533EFC78091AE5A951658478E593FC0;
see also Vahe Lskavyan & Mariana Spatareanu, Host Country's Governance and the Size of Foreign Investors, 100 Econ.
Letters 258 (2008).

223

Schill, supra note 43.

224

Emily A. Witten, Arbitration of Venezuelan Oil Contracts: A Losing Strategy?, 4 Tex. J. Oil, Gas & Energy L. 55,
56-57 (2008); ICSID Admits Exxon's Charges Against Venezuela from 2006 Only, El Universal, June 11, 2010, http://
english.eluniversal.com/2010/06/11/en_eco_esp_icsid-admits-exxons_ 11A4003971.shtml.

225

See, e.g., Rex J. Zedalis, The Legal Dimensions of Oil and Gas in Iraq: Current Reality and Future Prospects 4-8 (2009)
(detailing the history of British, Dutch and French company concessions in the area now known as Iraq dating from 1911).

226

Shemberg, supra note 27, P 25, at 6. In the author's view, one reason for the discrepancy may be that the expressed views came
from leading large law firms whose practices are not necessarily representative of modern contract practice generally.

227

Interview with practicing attorney who spoke on condition of anonymity (July 7, 2010).

228

See Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. & Compagnie Generale des Eaux v. Argentine Republic, Case
No. ARB/97/3, Award, PP 56-61, 96 (ICSID 2000), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?
requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC548_En&caseId=C159 (distinguishing a breach of the BIT and a
breach of contract). According to Laura Henry, “The overwhelming majority of cases have held that BIT Tribunals will
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not have jurisdiction over a contract claim between a State and an alien unless the government's conduct at the time of the
contractual breach also breached a substantive obligation under the treaty.” Investment Agreement Claims Under the 2004
Model U.S. BIT: A Challenge for State Police Powers?, 31 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. 935, 962 (2010). See also Thomas J. Pate, Evaluating
Stabilization Clauses in Venezuela's Strategic Association Agreements for Heavy-Crude Extraction in the Orinoco Belt: The
Return of a Forgotten Contractual Risk Reduction Mechanism for the Petroleum Industry, 40 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev.
347, 362 (2008-2009) (citing MCI Power Group v. Ecuador, “[o]ne can only assume that had the investor had the desire
and leverage to memorialize its expectations in a well-drafted stabilization clause, the tribunal may have reached a different
result.”); Parkerings-Compagniet v. Republic of Lith. Case No. ARB/05/8, Award, P 332 (ICSID 2007), available at http://
icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet? requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC682_En&caseId=C252
(“Save for the existence of an agreement, in the form of a stabilization clause or otherwise, there is nothing objectionable about
the amendment brought to the regulatory framework existing at the time an investor made its investment.”); Duke Energy
Int'l Peru Inv. Ltd. 1 v. Republic of Peru, Case No. ARB/03/28, Award (ICSID 2008), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/
documents/DukeEnergyPeruAward_ 000.pdf (enforcing tax stabilization provisions).

229

El Paso Energy Int'l Co. v. Argentine Republic, Case No. ARB/03/15, Decision on Jurisdiction, PP 84-88 (ICSID 2006),
reprinted in 21 ICSID Rev. (2006) (determining that the umbrella clause in the U.S.-Argentina BIT does not extend the Treaty
protection to breaches of an ordinary commercial contract entered into by the State or a State-owned entity, but will cover
additional investment protections contractually agreed by the State as a sovereign, such as a stabilization clause inserted into
an investment agreement). However, there is no doubt that if the State interferes with contractual rights by a unilateral act,
whether these rights stem from a contract entered into by a foreign investor with a private party, a State autonomous entity
or the State itself, in such a way that the State's action can be analyzed as a violation of the standards of protection embodied
in a BIT, the treaty-based arbitration tribunal has jurisdiction over all the claims of the foreign investor, including the claims
arising from a violation of its contractual rights.

230

John W. Boscariol, Foreign Investment Protection Treaties: Opportunities in the Petroleum Industry, 44 Alta. L. Rev. 115,
141 (2006).

231

See Robert E. Greig et al., How Bilateral Investment Treaties Can Protect Foreign Investors in the Arab World or Arab
Investors Abroad, 25 J. Int'l Arb 257, 259, 272 (2008) (giving the example of the United Arab Emirates-France BIT, which
protects corporations that are directly and indirectly controlled by French nationals or economic entities); Ranjan, supra note
8, at 221 (citing Fedax v. Venezuela, July 11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1378 (1998) in which holders of promissory notes who were
not entitled to investment protection transferred the notes to a Dutch company which then enabled treaty protection); Van
Harten, supra note 1, at 29 (describing how a domestic business can bring a claim under a BIT by making itself “foreign” by
establishing a holding company in the foreign country (citing South African and Pakistani reservations about BITs concluded
in the 1990s (citing Tokios Tokeles v. Ukr. 20 ICSID Rev. 205 (2005)))).

232

At least one international arbitration tribunal has permitted a domestic company to become “foreign” by setting up a holding
company in a neighboring state. Tokios Tokeles v. Ukr., 20 ICSID Rev. 205 (2005).

233

Yannick Radi, The Application of the Most-Favoured-Nation Clause to the Dispute Settlement Provisions of Bilateral
Investment Treaties: Domesticating the ‘Trojan Horse’, 18 Eur. J. Int'l L. 758, 759 (2007).

234

Vandevelde, The Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 119, at 493.

235

This is in part because the “market for dispute resolution” is less developed at the international level than domestically. See
Adam B. Badawi, Interpretive Preferences and the Limits of the New Formalism, 6 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 1 (2009) (arguing
that transactors choose dispute resolution forums based in part on a preference for formal versus contextual interpretation).
The certainty and predictability associated with domestic courts or tribunals adjudicating commercial disputes is significantly
reduced at the level of international investment disputes.

236

Peter Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law 497 (1995).

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

41

Harbison, Ashley 10/16/2017
For Educational Use Only

EFFICIENT CONTRACTING BETWEEN FOREIGN..., 31 Nw. J. Int'l L. &...

237

Scholars like the late Thomas Wäelde and Lorenzo Cotula do contend that their use is increasing, although it appears that
those assertions are supported by impressions rather than evidence.

238

See Brower & Schill, supra note 6. In one survey of Swiss corporate executives, investor-state contracts are rated with the
same importance for safeguarding investments as public investment guarantees and private insurance and only slightly lower
than BITs. Jentsch, supra note 23.

239

Id. at 1, 20.

240

See Brower & Schill, supra note 6, at 481-82; Schill, supra note 43, at 29; Yackee, International Investment Law, supra note
72, at 125; see generally Jentsch, supra note 22, at 10, 17, 19, 21.

241

Vandevelde, U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 6, at 625-26; see Franck, supra note 50, at 348; Jentsch, supra
note 22, at 25.

242

See, e.g., V.N. Balasubranyam, Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries: Determinants and Impact (2001).

243

Philip Moremen, Private Rights of Action to Enforce Rules of International Regimes, 79 Temp. L. Rev. 1127, 1159 (2006);
Vandevelde, supra note 120, at 473; see Yackee, Empirical Study of Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 2, at 406.

244

Salacuse, supra note 21.

245

Wäelde & Ndi, supra note 28, at 237.

246

Stiglitz, supra note 1, at 491. Stiglitz explains that developing countries agree to BITs “because the cost to the developing
country is less than the surplus they believe they will receive as a result of the trade deal.” Unfortunately, this determination is
often made by a limited set of government officials, excluding representatives from key ministries like health and environment
whose input may change the calculation.

247

Interview with Mark Kantor, Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, in Washington D.C. (Jun.
29, 2010); see also Janet Koven Levit, Bottom-up International Lawmaking: Reflections on the New Haven School of
International Law, 32 Yale J. Int'l L. 393, 398-408 (2007) (describing the bottom-up lawmaking process).

248

Interview with Mark Kantor, supra note 247.

249

Ranjan, supra note 8, at 230. Bangladesh, for example, has this clause in only three of fifteen BITs while Pakistan has it in
twenty-eight of thirty-one.

250

See Jonathan Hamilton, Brazil's BIT Dilemma, Global Arb. Rev., Dec. 17, 2009.

251

Ratner, supra note 18, at 516.

252

Vandevelde, U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 6, at 625.

253

William H. Cooper et al., Congressional Research Service, The Proposed U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS
FTA): Provisions and Implications 3 (2010) available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34330.pdf.

254

Deborah Ball & Cassell Bryan-Low, Swiss Tax Play Lures Business, Wall St. J., (Feb. 2, 2010), http:// online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748703422904575039431012272.

255

Alvarez, supra note 42, at 41.

256

Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment Agreements, in The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct
Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows 3, 25-26 (Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa
E. Sachs eds., 2009).
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257

Interview with Mark Kantor, Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, in Washington D.C. (Jun. 29,
2010). There are four departments that assist in trade treaty negotiations: the Office of the United States Trade Representative
(USTR), the State Department, the Department of Commerce, and the Treasury Department. Each department is usually
physically represented at negotiations as well.

258

See Yackee, Empirical Study of Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 2, at 462.

259

Jentsch, supra note 23, at 12 (citing an interview with the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs. Switzerland's objective
is to “sign a BIT with all countries that are not members of OECD... almost every day companies having problems with host
governments call SECO in order to negotiate with the foreign state.”).

260

Stiglitz, supra note 1, at 489.

261

Contra Ratner, supra note 18, at 483 (“The best evidence of this general coherence is simply that the outputs of the decisionmaking processes form a general, albeit not uniform, pattern--that the bulk of claims of regulatory takings are rejected,
typically because (1) the investor is found not to have a legitimate expectation of property right in what he claims was taken
from him; (2) the governmental measure does not have the requisite severe impact on his control of the investment; or (3) the
purpose and contours of the measure appear to place a fair burden on the investor compared to the public as a whole.”).

262

Alvarez, supra note 42, at 23-24.

263

Andrea Carska-Sheppard, Issues Relevant to the Termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 26 J. of Int'l Arb. 755, 755-71
(2009); Van Harten, supra note 1, at 23-24.

264

Robert E. Greig, Claudia Annacker, & Roland Ziade, How Bilateral Investment Treaties Can Protect Foreign Investors in the
Arab World or Arab Investors Abroad, 25 J. of Int'l Arb. 257, 259 (2008) (noting that renegotiations have mainly occurred
with Egypt and Morocco).

265

Van Harten, supra note 1, at 45-46 (“There are reports of investment treaties being signed as photo opportunities... there
was little evidence in the early 2000s when [Pakistan] faced its first BIT claim, that ministries in the Pakistani government
(beyond the one that had signed them) were aware of the country's BITs and that he was unable to uncover any records
demonstrating meaningful participation by Pakistan in the BIT negotiations.”); Lauge Skovgaard Poulsen & Damon VisDunbar, Reflections on Pakistan's investment treaty program after 50 years; an interview with the former attorney general
of Pakistan, Makhdoom Ali Khan, Inv. Treaty News (Apr. 2009); Press Release, Embassy of the United States, U.S.Pakistan Bilateral Investment Treaty Negotiations (May 12, 2005), available at http:// islamabad.usembassy.gov/pakistan/
h05051203.html. Pakistan's negotiating team consisted of the Secretary of the Pakistani Board of Investment (head), and
representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Industries and Production, Ministry of
Commerce, Central Board of Revenue, and State Bank of Pakistan. Uruguay's negotiating team consisted of representatives
from its Ministry of Economy and Finance, its Ambassador to the United States, and its Foreign Minister. See Press Release,
Embassy of Uruguay, United States - Uruguay Conclude Bilateral Investment Treaty (Sept. 7, 2004), available at http://
www.uruwashi.org/Archive%202004.htm#Embassy%C20Press%C20Releases%2#004.

266

See Yelpaala, supra note 39, at 241 (noting that many health and safety provisions are located in the preamble or couched
in non-binding terms); see also Yackee, Empirical Study of Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 2, at 423-27 (describing
how some variations of pre-consents are less binding than others).
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